Media frames and foreign policy: the New York Times\u27 editorial framing of India and Pakistan before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks by Kumar, Ashish
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2005 
Media frames and foreign policy: the New York Times' editorial 
framing of India and Pakistan before and after the September 11 
terrorist attacks 
Ashish Kumar 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Kumar, Ashish, "Media frames and foreign policy: the New York Times' editorial framing of India and 
Pakistan before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks" (2005). Retrospective Theses and 
Dissertations. 19145. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/19145 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Media frames and foreign policy: The New York Times' editorial framing of India 
and Pakistan before and after the September 11 terrorist attacks 
by 
Ashish Kumar 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Journalism and Mass Communication 
Program of Study Committee: 
Lulu Rodriguez (Major Professor) 
Daniela Dimitrova 
James McCormick 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2005 
Copyright© Ashish Kumar, 2005. All rights reserved. 
ii 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
Ashish Kumar 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
LIST OF FIGURES 












US FOREIGN POLICY TOW ARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN 6 
US Foreign Policy toward India and Pakistan 7 
The Kashmir Dispute 9 
US Foreign Policy and Pakistan 13 
US Foreign Policy and India 16 
US Foreign Policy toward India and Pakistan after 
September 11, 2001 21 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Media & Foreign Policy 
Framing as a Mass Media Theory 
Media Frames as Dependent Variables 
Media Frames as Independent Variables 











Conceptual and Operational Definitions of Variables 38 
The Frames 41 
Statistical Methods 48 
Coding and Training of Coders 48 
iv 
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
lntercoder Reliability 
Answering the Research Questions 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Studies 
APPENDIX A. CODE SHEET 













LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Map of the disputed area of Kashmir, India and Pakistan 10 
Figure 5.1. Frequency distribution of the geographic arena of editorials 53 
Figure 5.2. Country focus of the editorials 55 
Figure 5.3. Commonly occurring frames in the editorials 60 
Figure 5.4. The use of historical perspective in the editorials 64 
Figure 5.5. Tone of the focal frames used in the editorials 67 
Figure 5.6. Editorial tone toward Pakistan 69 
Figure 5.7. Editorial tone toward India 72 
Figure 5.8. Editorial portrayal of US relations with Pakistan 77 
Figure 5.9. Editorial portrayal of India 81 
Figure 5.10. Editorial tone toward US relations with Pakistan 82 
Figure 5 .11. Editorial tone toward US relations with India 86 
Figure 5.12. Editorial tone toward US policy regarding Pakistan 87 
Figure 5 .13. Editorial tone toward US policy regarding India 89 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 5.1. Editorial length in words 50 
Table 5.2. lntercoder reliability test results 52 
Table 5.3. Geographical arena of editorials 54 
Table 5.4. Country focus of editorials 56 
Table 5.5. Focal frames used in the editorials 59 
Table 5.6. The complementary frames used in the editorials 62 
Table 5.7. The supplementary frames used in the editorials 63 
Table 5.8. The use of historical perspective in the editorials 65 
Table 5.9. Tone of the focal frames used in the editorials 68 
Table 5.10. Editorial tone toward Pakistan 70 
Table 5.11. Editorial tone toward India 73 
Table 5.12. Mention of US relations or policy toward Pakistan 75 
Table 5.13. Mention of US relations or policy toward India 76 
Table 5.14. Portrayal of US relations with Pakistan 78 
Table 5.15. Portrayal of US relations with India 80 
Table 5.16. Tone toward US relations with Pakistan 83 
Table 5.17. Tone toward US relations with India 85 
Table 5.18. Tone toward US policy regarding Pakistan 88 
Table 5.19. Editorial tone toward US policy regarding India 90 
vii 
ABSTRACT 
To explore and understand the relationship between the US press and US foreign 
policy, this study investigated how the New York Times' editorial coverage framed India and 
Pakistan over a five and a half,year period, and analyzed the editorials' attitudes toward US 
relations with and policy toward the two South Asian countries. 
The study found that after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, US policy and 
relations with Pakistan changed drastically and this change was mirrored in the distinct and 
profound change in the Times' editorial coverage of the country. Before 9/11, US relations 
with Pakistan were highly strained and the Times reflected this in its editorials that were 
mostly negative toward Pakistan. After 9/11, Pakistan pledged support for the US war on 
terrorism and was embraced by the US administration as a major ally. The Times showed a 
parallel change by publishing editorials that were significantly more positive toward Pakistan. 
US policy toward India did not change as bilateral relations continued to improve slowly but 
steadily. The Times editorial coverage reflected the improving bilateral relations and remained 
positive toward India before and after 9/11. 
These findings provide evidence suggesting a relationship between the coverage of 
international news in the US press and US foreign policy. The study provides a baseline for 
further research on the determinants of international news coverage in the US press and on 




The role of the US free press has long been recognized as an essential component of 
American democracy and it's importance as an institution, deeply rooted in history and its 
professional character, is reflected in the pride of its press corps and the envy of journalists 
worldwide. Over the years, the press has been recognized for the important role it plays in a 
democracy and for the power it wields in the US political and social structures (Chang, 1993). 
In the area of foreign policy, there is wide consensus that the press has had and continues to 
have a significant role and affects the conduct of international diplomacy. However, there is 
uncertainty and much debate over the exact nature of the relationship between the press vis~ 
a~vis the government. Does the press function today as a dominant actor, independent in its 
agenda, and wielding significant influence in the formulation of foreign policy as suggested by 
the likes of the "CNN effects model," or does it serve as a sophisticated tool in the hands of 
government officials who, in the conduct of international diplomacy, use the press to further 
their own agendas? According to Gilboa (2002 ), the media play "multiple roles as they both 
constrain foreign policy officials and diplomats while providing them with opportunities to 
advance their goals" (p. 732). 
The role played by the media as a dominant actor in the formation of policies in 
foreign affairs is evident in the case of the Chinese government's crackdown on students' 
protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989 and the US administration's severe 
criticism of the incident. Former Secretary of State James Baker Ill wrote that "the terrible 
tragedy of Tiananmen was a classic illustration of a powerful new phenomenon: the ability of 
the global communications revolution to drive policy" (Baker, 1995, p. 103). Shaw (1996) 
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and Cohen ( 1994) found that media coverage influenced US foreign policy in a way that 
resulted in the 1991 intervention in northern Iraq and the 1992 intervention in Somalia. 
About these, US Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck wrote: "the media got us into 
Somalia and then got us out" ( 1996, p. 174). The power of the media to affect foreign policy 
has also been documented in subsequent policy decisions regarding the conflicts in Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Rwanda. 
However, research indicates that when reporting international news, the press selects 
and highlights particular aspects of reality that are consistent with the interpretations of the 
host country's national interests and political or cultural perspectives (Rachlin, 1988; Kim, 
2000). Several studies have further suggested that when reporting international news, a 
nation's press tends to "rally around the flag" and report news in a way that resonates with 
the government's voice (Kim, 2000). 
Herman and Chomsky ( 1988), in their book Manufacturing Consent, put forth the 
propaganda framework which claims that the media serve to further the hegemonic interests 
of those in power and that these interests actually color the coverage of international news. 
Their analysis of media ownership, organizational structure and reliance on advertising suggest 
that media coverage supports the foreign policy interests of the US government in their 
coverage of international conflicts. That is, media coverage of various international conflicts is 
considerably influenced by the US government's foreign policy. 
Allison ( 1971) offered a less than powerful effects model. His governmental politics 
model of the foreign policy decision,making process suggested that the press stands at the 
periphery of the decision making process and is an ad hoc player in the game of high politics. 
He contends that when it comes to foreign affairs, the press plays more of a supportive role 
rather than an advocacy role in governmental actions. 
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Lent (1977) provides a more nuanced explanation. According to him, international 
news coverage and usage are often determined by "considerations of international diplomacy, 
national government, military policies and historical-cultural heritage" ( p. 4 7). Providing 
evidence for this reasoning, Lynch and Effendi ( 1964) showed that the New York Times 
editorials' treatment of India became favorable as relations between the United States and 
India improved. In a comparative analysis of the coverage of the Kwangju and Tiananmen 
movements and massacres, Kim (2000) also found that the US media did report the two very 
similar conflicts in a diametrical manner and that the narrations coincided with US 
government definitions. Another comparative analysis of how the media frame international 
crises found that the downing of an Iranian plane was played down and attributed to 
technical problems while the Soviet downing of a Korean commercial jet was portrays as a 
moral outrage ( Entman, 1991). These results indicate that media portrayals of international 
incidents lean very closely toward the US government's representations and interpretations of 
those events. Despite the debate over the exact nature of the relationship between the press 
and the government, there is no denying that the media shapes the public's perception of 
other countries. How the US media portrayed India and Pakistan is no exception. 
After more than a century of "being on the periphery of US foreign policy," India, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan have become far more important for US national security interests 
than ever before (Wisner, 2002). Though South Asia is on the other side of the globe, "what 
happens there-as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda tragically 
underscored-can affect all Americans" (Wisner, 2002, p. 1). 
Before 9/11, US relations with India and Pakistan were perceived in the region and by 
Washington as part of the same equation. That is, "improvements in US relations with one 
were generally perceived (and sometimes intended) to come at the expense of the other" 
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(Feinstein, 2002, p. 3 ). However, after September 11, the United States found itself in the 
unaccustomed position of maintaining "good relations with India and Pakistan at the same 
time" (Feinstein, 2002, p. 3 ). 
The United States has had a long history of diplomatic involvement in South Asia. 
India and Pakistan gained independence from the British Empire in 194 7 and have fought 
three wars against each other since then. Of these, the first two were over the state of 
Kashmir. "In the past 15 years, the two countries have been embroiled in four military crises 
in which the United States has played an increasingly assertive role in managing and 
resolving" (Behera, 2002, p. 1). 
The end of the Cold War, the recent US military initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and the diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East have established the US as the only 
remaining global super power. How Washington, propelled by President Bush's "war against 
terrorism" leverages its new position to address core concerns in South Asia, including "the 
dispute over Kashmir, Pakistan's crisis of governance, and the evolving nuclear and missile 
rivalry in the region" (Feinstein, 2002, p. 3 ), offer a context for this study's area of inquiry. 
The US press has had a steady sprinkling of news about the conflict in Kashmir since 
an armed uprising began there in 1989. Press coverage increased in 1998 when India and 
Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in a demonstration of their respective nuclear capabilities. 
Because these two developing nations with nuclear power had been engaged in a "low 
intensity" war for the last 50 years or so, Kashmir has been labeled a "nuclear flashpoint" and 
has attracted the attention of the US media and their audiences. Because of the immense 
potential of this particular conflict to escalate into a nuclear showdown, it becomes important 
to analyze how news about the region is being framed in the US media and how these media 
frames relate to US foreign policy initiatives in South Asia. 
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With the purpose of exploring and understanding the relationship between the US 
press and US foreign policy, this study investigated the New York Times' editorial coverage for 
how it framed India and Pakistan over a five and a half ~year period starting in December 1998, 
and analyzed the editorials' attitudes toward US relations with and policy toward the two 
South Asian countries. The study was interested in identifying the frames commonly used by 
the editorials in their discussion of India and Pakistan and to see if the coverage of the two 
countries changed after 9/11. Did the editorial coverage mirror the changes in US relations 
and policy in India and Pakistan? 
The study of the coverage of international news is important because as Page and 
Shapiro (1992) suggested, the news content in the elite US news media shape both public 
opinion and government policies. To grasp the effects of media coverage on public perception 
requires understanding what, how and why the media frame topics and issues in certain ways, 
and how this depiction varies with time. This line of inquiry serves as a baseline with which 
other researchers can establish a causal relationship between media portrayals of foreign 
countries and foreign policy. 
Communication theory, critics assert, is too focused on media effects. Studies have 
concentrated on the relationship between media content and public behavior, but few have 
successfully looked into "how policy choices are cast in a way that shape news agenda" and 
"how symbols circulated in the media are created and planted by public officials" (Nimmo, 
1979, p. 13 ). Foreign policy is one such factor that has a profound bearing on the news 
coverage of international events. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
US POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
US political interest in South Asia has waxed and waned through the decades, and 
this is reflected in US policies toward the region over the last 65 years. Ambiguous at times 
and highly involved on other occasions, US policy in the region has been mostly interested in 
the maintenance of peace and stability. Colored by Cold War considerations for over four 
decades and nuclear proliferation during the 1990s, American policy toward the region is now 
driven by the war it has proclaimed on terrorism (Feinstein, 2002; Kronstadt, 2005). 
Ever since India and Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 194 7, 
US relations with the two countries seem to follow a zero,sum game. That is, when it 
improves with one, it sours with the other. Before the September 11 attacks, observers in the 
United States saw "India as rising" and "Pakistan as floundering" (Cohen, 2003, p. 2) in the 
eyes of the US administration. The United States and India were seen as "getting along better 
than at any time since India became independent" (Wisner, 2003, p. 11). Bilateral relations 
with Pakistan, on the other hand, were highly strained, as a result of which the United States 
was seen as distancing itself from the country. 
September 11 immensely changed the United States' short,term domestic and foreign 
policy, and the policy toward South Asia was among those that were drastically affected. The 
campaign to root out Osama bin Laden's terrorist network created "a turning point when 
Pakistan went from being almost condemned as a pariah state to being "the United States' 
most important ally" (Dunn, 2002, p. 23) in the war against terror. Perhaps for the first time, 
the United States "found itself ... having good relations with India and Pakistan at the same 
time" (Feinstein, 2002, p. 3 ). 
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In the grey world of post Cold War international politics and the intertwined and 
multi-consequential nature of foreign policy, it makes sense to analyze how American policy 
toward these two nations changed over time. This section establishes a historical perspective 
of the US policy toward India and Pakistan to provide a better understanding of the complex 
nature of politics in the region. It provides the necessary background for a comparative 
framework with which to analyze the change in US policy toward the region after September 
11 and how such a change was reflected in the media's coverage of India and Pakistan. 
US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
lndo-US relations predate the independence of India and Pakistan from the British 
colonial empire in 194 7. George Washington, in 1 792, appointed Benjamin Joy as counsel to 
Calcutta, the capital of British India. Over the next century and a half, US political and 
economic relations with British India were almost non-existent. American missionaries were, 
in fact, the principal link to the subcontinent. In the 1920s and 1930s, India's struggle for 
independence, fueled by Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent protests against British rule, 
generated considerable press coverage in the United States (Kux, 1992). When Franklin D. 
Roosevelt became president in 1933, New Deal liberals were sympathetic toward the Indian 
struggle for independence, but the White House did not actively support the independence 
struggle. The US became more involved in the Indian subcontinent on the eve of America's 
entry into WWII, when it started applying pressure on Britain to grant India self-rule. 
President Roosevelt, in a conversation with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 
August 1941, was expressed his bafflement "that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, but 
at the same time not work to free people from all over the world from a backward colonial 
policy" (Roosevelt, 1946, p. 36). 
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As such, on November 1941, a US mission was established in Delhi and an Indian 
agent-general set up office in Washington. The US administration believed that the Indians 
could better serve the Allied war effort if it were guaranteed freedom at the end of the war. 
Facing a determined independence struggle and growing international pressure, the British 
started the process of establishing self-rule in the country. The US played an active role in this 
process by pressing the British to negotiate with the Indians. Washington also increased its 
presence in the subcontinent by using it as a base of operations, providing help to the 
Chinese who were fighting against the Japanese invasion of the Far East (Kux, 1992). 
The Americans, however, were disappointed at the Indian nationalists' attitudes 
toward the war effort. The Indian National Congress wanted independence from British rule, 
but the top priority for the Americans was to win WWII. Even though the US had pressed 
the British to grant India independence, it needed to support Britain against the Axis forces, 
and felt it could push the British no longer without damaging the war effort. "Because Indians 
and Americans expected- and thought they deserved- each other's support, the course of 
events during the war sharpened the mutual disappointment" (Kux, 1992, p. 38). 
In August 194 7, India gained independence and Pakistan was carved from the Indian 
landmass. India was to be a secular nation with Hindus in the majority, and Pakistan was 
established as an Islamic state. The partition caused a large-scale migration of people. 
According to Bajpai (2003 ), 11 million to 15 million Hindus and Sikhs in what is now 
Pakistan crossed over to the Indian side of the border, and some 30 million to 35 million 
Muslims crossed over to Pakistan. The partition was marked by widespread sectarian and 
communal violence across the two countries and left a bitter after-taste that pervades even 
today among people across the borders (Bajpai, 2003 ). The two-nation theory, despite 
growing popularity in the subcontinent, had few buyers in Washington. President Roosevelt 
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supported efforts to maintain a united India (Kux, 2001), but because US foreign policy was 
more concerned at that time with the containment of the Soviets and communism; it "simply 
did not perceive major interests in the subcontinent" (Bajpai, 2003, p. 16). This was reflected 
in the fact that the US had few explicit policy aims regarding India or Pakistan during that 
period. 
THE KASHMIR DISPUTE 
"India,Pakistan differences over Kashmir, still unresolved after 56 years of 
independence, lie at the heart of their rivalry" (Wisner, 2003, p. 14). This conflict remains 
the single greatest threat to regional stability in South Asia and is therefore of great concern 
to US policy makers. Frustrated by earlier attempts at conflict resolution, the US 
administration has in recent years concentrated on crisis management. 
The dispute originated in 194 7 when the rulers of territories and principalities were 
encouraged to join India or Pakistan. The Hindu King of the state of Kashmir refused to do 
so. In October, Pakistani militia attacked Kashmir. Lacking a standing army, the King 
appealed to Delhi for help and signed a document of accession to India (Feinstein, 2002; 
Kronstadt, 2005; Kux, 1992, 2001 ). 
Indian paramilitary troops were flown into the state and were successful in driving the 
Pakistani militia from the Kashmiri capital city of Srinagar. Fighting continued between the 
Indian and Pakistani troops until the United Nations brokered a ceasefire in January 1949. A 
line of control (LOC) divided Kashmir into two. To resolve the conflict over the disputed 
region, the UN proposed the bilateral withdrawal of troops and the holding of a plebiscite 
(Kux, 1992, 2001 ). 
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FIGURE 2.1. THE DISPUTED AREA OF KASHMIR AND ITS GEOGRAPHICAL 
LOCATION RELATIVE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
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The plebiscite never took place as the two countries did not withdraw troops, and 
India refused to accept the proposal that Kashmir be under UN administration. Frustrated by 
several attempts to solve the crisis, the US retreated to a policy of crisis management (Kux, 
2001). 
On August 5-6, 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, which was aimed to 
"defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference 
table without provoking a general war" (Gauhar, 1996, p. 328). As part of the operation, a 
large army from Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PAK) infiltrated the part of Kashmir under 
Indian control to carry out arson and sabotage. Pakistan thought this would cause the 
Kashmiri people to start an insurgency against the Indians. In response, the Pakistani generals 
thought, the Indians would suppress the movement, thus angering Muslim opinion 
throughout the world and validating their intervention in Kashmir. Islamabad assumed that 
the international community would intervene to force a Kashmir settlement and prevent an 
all-out war (Kux, 2001). 
However, by late August, it was clear that Operation Gibraltar has failed. Pakistan sent 
a large armored force to cut off the Indian army in Kashmir. Within a week, India launched a 
counter-offensive, sending several divisions across the international border toward the 
Pakistani city of Lahore. Realizing that they were about to be overrun, the Pakistani premiere, 
Ayub Khan, requested the United States to come to its aid. The Johnson administration 
balked. Instead, it suspended all economic and military aid to both India and Pakistan and 
backed the UN peace efforts. The Pakistanis reluctantly signed a ceasefire in January 1966. By 
the time Johnson left office in 1969, the US-Pakistan alliance had shriveled. Ayub Khan, 
feeling betrayed by the Americans, found a new friend in communist China (Kux, 2001 ). 
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Enraged by the Indian central government's rigging of local elections, Kashmiri 
dissidents took to arms in December 1989. In response, Indian authorities dissolved the local 
government, placed Kashmir under direct rule, and ordered the military to quell the 
insurgency. Claiming that the insurgents were being trained and financed by Pakistan, India 
increased its military presence along the de facto border. Pakistan followed suit, resulting to 
intense cross,border firing as the two countries veered dangerously close to a third war over 
Kashmir (Feinstein, 2002; Kronstadt, 2005). 
"The risk of nuclear confrontation compelled Washington to involve itself more 
directly in the sub continental tensions than it had for many years" (Kux, 1991, p. 433 ). 
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of America as the sole military superpower, 
bilateral ties between India and the US began improving. Washington no longer backed a UN 
plebiscite (the Pakistani preference) and instead supported bilateral India,Pakistan talks (the 
Indian preference) (Kux, 2002). 
In May 1999, the Indians learned that a large number of Pakistani insurgents had 
crossed the line of control in the far north of Kashmir, and had occupied positions in the 
mountains overlooking the town of Kargil as well as a vital road link between Srinagar, the 
state capital, and the northern area of Ladakh. Then US President Clinton, concerned about 
the prospects of a nuclear war, asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces. When its ally, China, 
refused to back the Kargil misadventure, Pakistan felt internationally isolated and withdrew its 
forces (Kux, 2001). 
Through the years, Pakistan continued to increase its support of Kashmiri insurgents, 
providing them with arms and ammunition, training in guerilla warfare, logistical, financial, 
moral and doctrinal support. No one was surprised, therefore, that the Kashmir situation, 
initially political in nature, was redefined as a religious conflict, a religious struggle for justice by 
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Muslims oppressed by Hindus. The insurgency, initially secular in nature and local in 
composition, has been transformed into one that is "largely carried out by foreign militants 
and rationalizes in pan, Islamic religious terms" (Chalk, 2001). 
At the turn of the last century, US foreign policy, affected by its own revolutionary 
war, was marked with anti,imperialist tones and sought to help colonial people gain 
independence. However, by the 1950s, the containment of communism became the driving 
force behind US foreign policy for the next 44 years. The Americans, however, were not 
worried about Pakistan or India joining the communist bloc, and neither the USSR nor 
China made any move to influence the political structure in either of the two countries. Since 
the Soviet Union kept largely aloof from the region, Kashmir lacked Cold War considerations, 
and the dispute was relegated to the backburner of US foreign policy. 
US FOREIGN POLICY AND PAKISTAN 
Pakistan, from the start, had been able to forge a friendship with successive American 
administrations. However, the dependence was too one,sided for the two countries to be 
labeled as allies. When India irked the US by deciding to walk the "neutralist path" and start 
the non,aligned movement at the height of the Cold War, Pakistan became "a potential 
partner in security arrangements for containing the Soviet expansion in the Middle East" 
(Kux, 2001, p. 359). This relationship proved, for a variety of reasons, to be volatile, and 
"during the four decades of the Cold War, US interests in Pakistan waxed and waned as 
administrators judged the country to be helpful or harmful to American global aims" (Kux, 
2001, p. xviii). The Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan administrations had Pakistan,friendly 
foreign policies. However, during the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush Sr. and Clinton 
presidencies, relations between the two countries could be characterized as strained. 
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During the 1980s, Pakistan served as a base of US operations against the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. However, in 1979, President Carter imposed unilateral military and 
economic sanctions on Pakistan on the discovery that Islamabad had been working on 
nuclear program components in violation of the Symington Amendment. These sanctions 
were waived later that year on account of Pakistan's support of the anti-Soviet efforts in 
Afghanistan. In the 1980s, the United States continued to provide military aid to Pakistan to 
modernize its conventional defensive capability. During this period, the US allocated about 
40% of its assistance package for military purchases, the third largest program behind Israel 
and Egypt. The rest of the aid program consisted of economic assistance (Kronstadt, 2005; 
Rajkumar, 2001 ). But since the departure of the Soviet army, relations between the two 
countries soured on account of Pakistan's continuing clandestine nuclear program. In 1990, 
the first Bush administration could not certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
explosive device {Kronstadt, 2005; Rajkumar, 2001). As a result, the Pressler Amendment, 
which called for sanctions on government-to-government military sales and new economic 
assistance, went into effect. This sanction effectively ruptured US-Pakistan security ties 
(Feinstein, 2002; Kronstadt, 2005). 
During the 1990s, "bilateral relations further soured because of Islamabad's support of 
militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir and its lackadaisical approach to anti-
narcotics efforts" (Kux, 2002, p. 19). Pakistan featured in the US State Department reports 
(1993-2000) titled "Sources of global terrorism" as supporting the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and the militants in Kashmir. The country was apparently "on the brink" of 
being of labeled a sponsor of international terrorism according to James Woolsey, then 
director of central intelligence {Jehl, 1993 ). 
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In May 1998, when Pakistan matched India's nuclear tests by exploding six nuclear 
bombs, President Clinton imposed the Glenn Amendment sanctions on both India and 
Pakistan. These sanctions caused all sort of economic development assistance, military sales, 
credit and guarantees by the US government, loans from US and international banks to be 
suspended or terminated. Pakistan soon found itself heading toward economic disaster (Kux, 
2001 ). 
The relationship continued to go downhill when the US did not support the 
Pakistani army's intrusion into the Indian area of Kashmir in May 1999, and urged Nawaz 
Shariff, then Pakistani prime minister, to withdraw forces across the Kashmir line of control. 
Washington imposed additional sanctions on Pakistan after the army, under General Pervez 
Musharraf, seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat in October 1999. These sanctions, legally 
required in the case of the overthrow of a democratically elected government, had little impact 
as Pakistan was already under severe sanctions because of the Pressler Amendment and the 
US retaliation against the 1998 nuclear tests (Kux, 2001). 
In March 2000, Clinton paid a short visit to Pakistan. In his address to the nation, he 
spoke of the friendly ties between the two countries and promised that Pakistan would benefit 
by "lowering the temperature on Kashmir, by reigning in terrorist groups, by pressing the 
Taliban to be more forthcoming on bin Laden and on peace talks, and by undertaking 
nonproliferation measures" (Kux, 2001, p. 357). 
Thus, before Sept. 11, US relations with Pakistan could be described as "strained." 
Pakistan's steady marginalization since the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Afghanistan 
and the end of the Cold War was a marked feature of US foreign policy by then. Pakistan 
gained notoriety for clandestinely developing nuclear weapons, supporting international 
terrorism, slipping from democracy to military rule, and becoming a hotbed for Islamic 
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fundamentalism. "Indeed, few supposed US friends, let alone allies, have been on the 
receiving end of as many sanctions as has Pakistan" (Kux, 2001, p. 361). 
US FOREIGN POLICY AND INDIA 
The relationship between India and the US over the last half-century has been "on 
occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but more often than not, just estranged" (Kux, 1992, p. 
44 7). In the 194 7 war over Kashmir, the United States, reluctant to take sides, backed the 
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan's (UNCIP) efforts toward resolving the 
dispute. Much to India's distaste, the UN did not label Pakistan as the aggressor and called for 
a plebiscite in Kashmir. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru saw the American position as 
influenced less by the merits of the dispute and more by the emerging US global interests in 
light of the tensions with the Soviets. By 1949, lndo-US relations had fallen into "a pattern 
of chronic friction" (Kux, 1992, p. 89). In addition to the Kashmir issue, differences arose 
because India did not share the US concern of "a worldwide threat from the Soviet Union 
and its fellow communist states" (Kux, 1992, p. 89) and its frequent criticism of US policy. As 
a result, the Truman administration halted economic and development aid to India. 
With the start of the Korean War in 1950, Cold War considerations became a 
dominant element of US foreign policy. The first formal foreign policy for South Asia stated 
that if India were lost to the communists the way China was, "for all practical purposes, all of 
Asia would have been lost" (Kux, 1992, p. 88). In light of the assessment, the policy toward 
India gravitated toward "closer consultations, an economic aid program, the supply of military 
equipment and efforts to improve Inda-Pakistan relations" (Kux, 1992, p. 88). This policy 
facilitated the 19 5 2 sale of 200 Sherman tanks and 54 C-119 transport planes to India to 
17 
modernize its army and a $190 million package of food and developmental aid to bolster 
India's lagging economy (Kux, 1992). 
India's decision to follow the path of non-alignment and its frequent criticism of US 
foreign policy was not appreciated in Washington. After initially trying to avoid taking sides 
in the India-Pakistan dispute, Washington, concerned about a Soviet expansionist thrust 
into the oil-rich Persian Gulf, decided to bolster defenses in the region by arming and 
developing a close security relationship with an eager Pakistan. By 1954, US military aid to 
Pakistan became a major concern for India when the US declared Pakistan a military ally and 
a friend. Consequently, India edged closer to Moscow, marking a downturn in Indo-US 
relations (Kux, 1992). 
US policy toward India saw a dramatic change in 195 7 when President Eisenhower 
declared that India's policy of neutralism was not against American interests. Eisenhower saw 
the need for a strong democratic India as "an example of an alternative to Communism in an 
Asian context" ( Kux, 1992, p. 154). The policy placed greater emphasis on economic rather 
than military aid as a means of combating the growing Soviet influence in the region. 
Meanwhile, the once friendly relations between India and China deteriorated due to a border 
dispute. China also fumed when India granted political refuge to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual 
head of the Tibetans who were revolting against the Chinese annexation of Tibet. As 
relations between India and communist China deteriorated, the United States supported the 
Indian claim. 
Under President Kennedy, the US dramatically increased economic aid to India, and 
when the border conflict between India and China escalated to war in 1962, Washington set 
about helping India modernize its army and air force. Still the relationship between the two 
countries did not blossom into an alliance. Unwilling to further upset Pakistan, the Kennedy 
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administration did not pursue the development of a long-term military agreement with New 
Delhi (Kux, 1992). 
Dismayed that the two countries went to war despite a decade of heavy American 
economic and military aid, Johnson imposed military sanctions and suspended all economic 
aid to both countries. The Americans were further disappointed as India seemed to be going 
nowhere economically. Frequent famines had left India ever more dependent on US 
humanitarian food aid. "Unable to feed herself, India was hardly the model of democratic 
development Washington had hoped Third World nations would emulate as a rival to 
communist China" (Kux, 1992, p. 268). Unhappy with India's dependence on the United 
States for wheat, President Johnson held back shipments of the grain, and coerced New Delhi 
to adopt an agricultural policy aimed at making India self reliant in food. 
Richard Nixon entered the White House in January 1969 wanting to ensure that 
neither China nor the Soviet Union gained an upper hand in the region, to promote 
economic development, and to encourage the two countries to resolve their differences. 
However, India and Pakistan declared war on each other again on December 3, 1971 
(Kronstadt, 2005; Kux, 1992, 2001). The US administration declared that India bore the 
responsibility for the war and suspended all military sales and economic aid to the country. On 
December 16, Pakistani forces surrendered in Dhaka, and this marked the breaking away of 
what was then known as East Pakistan to form Bangladesh (Kronstadt, 2005; Kux, 1992, 
2001). President Nix on, concerned about saving West Pakistan, sent the aircraft carrier 
Enterprise and other supporting vessels to the Bay of Bengal as a show of force and to deter 
the Indians from further aggression. When the Indians and Pakistanis concluded a peace 
accord in Simla in July 1972, US policy was still tilted toward Pakistan. India conducted 
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nuclear tests in 1975 that did not sit well with the Ford White House. Even at the end of 
Carter's term, lndo,US relations remained lukewarm (Kux, 1992). 
The Reagan administration initially saw India as "politically opposed and economically 
irrelevant to American interests" and their prime concern in South Asia was in "re,arming 
Pakistan and promoting resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan" (Kux, 1992, p. 417). 
Even though neither country substantially altered its basic policies, lndo,US relations 
improved as a result of greatly increased dialogue among top level government officials. 
Bilateral rhetoric became more positive, and Washington eased barriers to technology transfer 
and approved defense,related technology cooperation with the Indians (Kux, 1992). 
"Although India and the United States shared common values inherent in a 
democracy, the two nations often found themselves not only geographically, but politically 
and economically on opposite sides of the globe" (Wisner, 2003, p. 13 ). The Americans did 
not appreciate India's "preachy neutralism," its socialist economic policies, nor its friendship 
treaty with the Soviet Union. The Indians were upset with the close US, Pakistan security ties 
and the US tendency to lecture others. This started to change in 1989 with the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. George Bush's 
term in the White House witnessed "the disappearance of the two principal bones of bilateral 
contention: the Indo,Soviet relationship and the US, Pakistan security links" (Kux, 2002, p. 
19). India's close security ties to Russia no longer bothered the American administration, and 
Washington was pleased about the major economic reforms adopted by Indians to reduce 
government controls and restrictions in a shift away from socialist toward free market policies. 
Pakistan's importance as a frontline state against the Soviets, however, diminished for the 
Americans. Economic aid was suspended to Pakistan and US-Pakistan security ties ruptured 
in October 1990 due to Islamabad's covert nuclear weapons program (Feinstein, 2002; 
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Kronstadt, 2005). During the 1990s, US-Pakistan relations further soured due to Islamabad's 
support for militant Islamic groups in Kashmir and Afghanistan and its lackadaisical approach 
to anti-narcotics efforts. Despite this, Indo-US bilateral relations did not warm up, and it can 
be said that during the Bush term in the White House, the administration maintained a 
disengaged policy toward the region (Kux, 2002). 
This disengaged policy continued during Bill Clinton's first term in the White House. 
India, despite growing international pressure, refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In May 1998, India 
conducted five nuclear tests and Pakistan followed suit, conducting six nuclear tests later in 
the month. The tests signified a major setback to two decades of US nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts in the subcontinent. The Clinton administration was disappointed that its diplomatic 
efforts and economic incentives to get the two countries to curtail their nuclear programs were 
of no avail, and imposed wide-ranging congressionally mandated sanctions on both countries 
(Feinstein, 2002; Kronstadt, 2005; Kux, 2002). 
Oddly enough, relations between the two countries improved after India's sally into 
the nuclear club. "Even though 12 rounds of talks between US Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott and Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh failed to significantly 
narrow differences on nuclear issues, the discussions gave New Delhi and Washington a 
clearer understanding of each other's viewpoints and marked the most intensive high-level 
US-India dialogue in decades" (Wisner, 2003, p. 22). Keeping in line with its policy of 
maintaining stability in South Asia, Washington intervened in the 1999 Kargil crisis to 
pressure Pakistan to withdraw its forces after its attempts to seize strategic heights near Kargil 
on the Indian side of the LOC in Kashmir (Kronstadt, 2005; Wisner, 2003). This was 
followed by a five-day Presidential visit by Bill Clinton to India and Prime Minister Atal 
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Bihari Vajpayee's visit to the United States, which signaled a new and positive chapter in 
bilateral relations (Wisner, 2003 ). 
When George W. Bush became President on January 2001, his tilt toward India was 
apparent when he "dropped by" the Indian Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh's 
meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and had a cordial 40-minute talk 
with the minister in the Oval Office. When Bush unveiled his controversial nuclear missile 
defense proposals the next month, the Vajpayee government responded far more positively 
than did most US allies (Kronstadt, 2005, Kux, 2002). Indeed, in the years that preceded the 
September 11 attacks, the two countries saw a substantial improvement in bilateral ties. 
US POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
After September 11, India responded rapidly and decisively (Kux, 2002) by 
condemning the attack and offering its full support of the US war on terrorism. On September 
13, Pakistan's military ruler, General Musharraf, condemned the attacks, and under US 
diplomatic pressure, joined the US-led coalition against its former Taliban allies in 
Afghanistan (Clad, 2002). 
September 11 served as the preface to a new chapter in US policy toward India and 
Pakistan. The Bush administration enlisted their cooperation in America's war against 
terrorism. Since Pakistan joined the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has waved 
sanctions and has started providing "substantial amounts of economic assistance, debt relief, 
and security aid. Close military, intelligence, and law-enforcement ties have been re-
established" (Kronstadt, 2005, Wisner, 2003, p. 48). 
The change in policy for India was not as dramatic. The removal of all nuclear-related 
sanctions had already been planned before September 11, but were announced 12 days after, 
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along with the news that sanctions on Pakistan were being lifted as well (Kronstadt, 2005, 
Feinstein, 2002). "After nearly four decades of almost no interactions between US and Indian 
defense establishments" (Kux, 2002, p. 21 ), Bush launched a series of initiatives, including 
high level military visits, joint training exercises, and eased restrictions on the sale of dual-use 
technologies. Though the scale of these initiatives was small, they have had a bigger political 
impact and have propelled the two countries toward the bilateral ties that are the closest they 




With the purpose of exploring the relationship between the US press and US foreign 
policy, this study investigated the New Yark Times' editorial coverage for how it framed India 
and Pakistan, and analyzed the editorials' attitudes toward US relations and policy in the two 
South Asian countries. There are several readings about the relationship between the press in 
the shaping of foreign policy, and the conduct of international diplomacy. 
"What we know about the nature of the social world depends on how we frame and 
interpret the clues we receive about that world" (Edelman, 1993, p. 231). International 
events, politics and conflicts are beyond the direct experience of average citizens who depend 
upon the mass media to inform them of what is going on outside their own country. In the 
area of foreign affairs, the news media often serves as the only source of international news and 
information for the US public, and thus have a decisive role in constructing the image of 
foreign countries. They do so, consciously or unconsciously, by framing news in ways that 
create, reinforce and even change attitudes toward other countries (Chang, 1993; Serfaty, 
1990; Yoon and Gwangho, 2002). 
MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Over the years, the US press has been recognized for its importance as an institution 
critical to democracy and for the power it wields on the political and social system (Chang, 
1993 ). In the area of foreign policy, there is wide consensus that the press has had and 
continues to have a significant role in the conduct of international diplomacy. However, there 
is uncertainty and much debate over the exact nature of the relationship between the press 
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vis-a-vis the government. Does the press function today as a dominant actor, independent in 
its agenda, and wielding significant influence in the formulation of foreign policy as suggested 
by the likes of the "CNN effects model," or does it function as a sophisticated tool in the 
hands of government officials who use it to further their own diplomatic agendas in the 
pursuit of international diplomacy? According to Gilboa (2002), the media play "multiple 
roles as they both constrain foreign policy officials and diplomats while providing them with 
opportunities to advance their goals" (p. 732). 
Allison (1971) however, offers a less than powerful effects model. In his study of 
foreign policy decision-making, he suggests that the press is an ad hoc player in the game of 
high politics, standing at the periphery of US foreign policy decision making process. The 
press, he says, plays more of a supportive role rather than an advocacy role in governmental 
actions. He contends that the structure of foreign policy decision making is made up of four 
concentric rings. The inner most and smallest circle consists of the US president and his 
closest advisors. The second and third rings include the Congress, the military, interest groups 
and political parties. The press and the public make up the fourth ring and are the farthest 
away from the decision making process. He argues that foreign policy decisions are a result of 
political bargaining games played out at the top of the government hierarchy. Though he 
recognizes the multiplicity of the players, including the press, in the decision-making process, 
he does not elucidate the extent to which the press influences or is influenced by the other 
actors. 
In their book Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky (1988) put forth the 
"propaganda model," which states that the press is dependent on, and is therefore reflective of 
the dominant power structure. The media operate within the boundaries of established social 
norms and reflect the dominant ideology. Through both coercion and consensus, the 
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dominant elite manufactures consent of the people by fixing frames of reference and agendas 
in the media. Herman and Chomsky ( 1988) say that in the reporting of foreign news in 
particular, the media tend to cover events and issues in other countries based on US policy 
toward those countries. The media operate within the dichotomy of "friendly" versus 
"unfriendly" states and are decidedly anti-communist, according to the propaganda model. In 
the media's coverage of political or military conflict, communists are always treated as unjust 
and brutal enemies of the people, even if they actually have popular support, and non-
communists are portrayed as fighting for freedom and struggling to establish democracy, 
regardless of their political practices or human rights records. In its coverage of negative events 
in other countries, media reports frame the victims as "worthy" or "unworthy" depending on 
the nature of the relations the regime has with the United States (Reta, 2002). 
Entman (2004) proposes the cascading network activation model to explain how 
information flows down from US administration officials to the media and then to the public. 
The US media's coverage of China through the 1960s and 1970s serves as an interesting 
example of this cascading effect. Until the early 1970s, US policy toward China was hostile 
and colored by anti-communist fervor. The media reflected this in their use of negative 
references to China, such as "red China" and "communist China." However, following 
President Richard Nixon's rapprochement with China in 1972, the Nixon administration 
adopted a friendlier "one China" policy, and the negative references toward China were 
dropped. The US media reflected this change in policy by eschewing the negative references 
and minimizing critical reports about China (Chang, 1993). 
Previous studies that analyzed the press coverage of US policies toward India 
(Ramprasad & Riffe, 1987) and Pakistan (Becker, 1977) found no evidence suggesting a 
relationship between the press coverage and US foreign policy. However, other studies that 
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looked at US policies and press coverage toward India (Lynch & Effendi, 1964 ), China 
(Chang, 1993 ), and Vietnam (Berry, 1990) found significant evidence showing a relationship 
between coverage and foreign policies and press support for US polices in the respective 
countries. 
Studies have also analyzed the coverage of international disasters, such as the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in China, the Kwangju massacre in South Korea (Kim, 2000), 
the downing of a Korean passenger jet by a Soviet fighter plane, and the shooting down of an 
Iranian passenger jet by a US Navy ship (Entman 1993 ). Malinkina and Mcleod (2000) 
analyzed how the New York Times and the Russian newspaper Izvestia covered the conflicts 
in Afghanistan and Chechnya to examine the impact of political change on news coverage. 
These studies provided strong evidence to suggest that the US press is mostly supportive of 
US foreign policy toward the countries involved, and that the press reflect the views of the 
government in their coverage of foreign policy and international news. They contend that US 
foreign policy goals and presidential initiatives have a significant impact on how foreign affairs 
and international news are reported. 
This study examines the interaction between the frames used in the US media's 
portrayal of India and Pakistan and the US foreign policy toward the two countries by 
analyzing how the New York Times covered India and Pakistan before and after 9/11. 
FRAMING AS A MASS MEDIA THEORY 
Framing, a relatively new concept in mass media theory, is a cognitive process that 
helps organize into mental maps the floods of information people are subjected to everyday 
(Graber, 1988). These mental maps are called schemas and have been defined as "cognitive 
structures consisting of organized knowledge about situations and individuals that has been 
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abstracted from prior experiences." Schemas are used to process new information and retrieve 
stored information (Graber, 1988, p. 23 ). 
Scholars conceive of schemas as complex cognitive structures similar to filing cabinets. 
Each cabinet has several files that may be called frames. Framing is closely related to schema 
theory in that schemas can be seen as being composed of several frames. 
The idea of framing first appeared in Goffman's (1974) seminal work that provided 
evidence that the organization of messages affects subsequent thoughts and actions. According 
to Goffman ( 197 4), people actively classify and organize their life experiences to make sense of 
them. These "schemata of interpretation" are labeled frames. They enable individuals to 
"locate, perceive, identify, and label" the world around them. Hence, he defined frames as 
mental structures that are closely related to the ideas of scripts and schemas from the literature 
on social cognition. 
According to Gamson and Modigliani (1987) a frame is the "central organizing idea" 
and helps in making sense of relevant events by suggesting what is at issue ( p. 14 3). Their 
general idea is that a frame is an ever,present discursive device that channels the audience as it 
constructs the meaning of particular communicative acts. Cohen ( 1981) says that these 
frames of reference are in general not loosely connected and that there is an organization and 
order within a person's cognitive map or schema. 
Formally proposing framing as a theory of media effects, Scheufele ( 1999) summarizes 
the more recent studies that examined frames and categorizes frames into two types: media 
frames and individual frames. 
Gamson and Modigliani ( 198 7) conceptually defined a media frame as "a central 
organizing idea or story line that provide meaning to an unfolding strip of events ... The 
frames suggest what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue." Entman ( 1993), 
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elaborating on how the media provide audiences with schemas to interpret events, says that 
"to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
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communication text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (p. 52). Media frames 
serve as working routines for journalists to quickly identify and classify information and to 
package it for efficient relay to audiences (Gitlin, 1980). This concept of media framing can 
include the intent of the sender, but the motives can also be unconscious ones (Gamson, 
1989). The framing and presentation of events and news in the mass media can thus 
systematically affect how recipients of the news come to understand these events (Price, 
Tewksbury, and Powers, 1995). 
On the other hand, individual frames are defined as "mentally stored clusters of ideas 
that guide individuals' processing of information" (Entman, 1993, p. 53 ). McLeod et al. 
(1987) conceptually defined individual frames as cognitive devices that "operate as non, 
hierarchical categories that serve as forms of major headings into which any future news 
content can be filed" (p. 10). Individual frames are closely related to the concept of schemata 
in that several individual frames interact to form an individual's schema. Individual frames are 
the schematic dimensions that Graber ( 1988) discussed as forming the cognitive structure 
consisting of organized knowledge about situations individuals have abstracted from prior 
experiences and are used for processing new information and retrieving stored information. 
Media frames and audience frames can be studied as independent variables or as 
dependent variables. This study investigates the relationship between the frames present in 
the coverage of India and Pakistan in the US media and the US foreign policy toward South 
Asia and thus looks at frames as dependent variables. 
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MEDIA FRAMES AS DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Based on previous research, five factors have been found to influence how journalists 
frame a given issue: social norms, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest 
groups, journalistic routines and ideological or political orientations of journalists (Scheufele, 
1999). The news items also have thematic or schematic structures, which further affect the 
way the news is framed (Dijk, 1985). Edelman (1993) provided some evidence in an 
exploratory qualitative analysis of the news coverage of the 1991 Gulf War that claimed that 
authorities and pressure groups categorize beliefs in a way that marshals support and 
oppositions to their interest. These groups effectively use the media to establish frames of 
reference suited to their own interests. 
"Governments grant benefits that are sometimes lavish to some and impose 
deprivation, pain, and misery upon many. They win public support for these actions only by 
creating and spreading beliefs about those who are deserving and those who are threats and 
about which policies will bring desirable results and which will be painful, unfair, or disastrous. 
In short, about what causes what" (Edelman, 1993, p. 231). He adds that "a war may be 
named a noble crusade (in which case the killing of innocent civilians and profiteering that 
conflict brings are minimized) or it may be labeled as an act of unjustified aggression (in which 
case carnage and profiteering become a major force of attention and claims about the national 
goals to be realized from victory are repressed)" ( p. 231). 
Research has shown that in reporting international news, the media select and 
highlight particular aspects of reality, particularly those that favor government voices (Kim, 
2000). World events are portrayed in keeping with the country's national interests and 
political or cultural perspective (Rachlin, 1988). From the media coverage of the 2003 war in 
Iraq, it is evident that in reporting international news, the nation's media tended to "rally 
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around the flag" and to report the news in a manner consistent with the government's 
interpretation. Terrorist organizations were described in the media as "enemies of freedom and 
the American way oflife" and as "evil". These were the same sort of categorizations used over 
and over again in countless speeches by President George W. Bush and the members of his 
administration. That his statements become the subject of news stories attests to the 
relationship between his speeches and media frames (Entman, 2004 ). 
A study analyzing the New York Times and Washington Post news coverage and US 
foreign policy responses concerning two similar East Asian pro-democracy movements in the 
1980s found that two movements were reported using news sources and symbolic terms that 
dramatically coincided with the US government's stance and definition of the conflict (Kim, 
2000). The focus of the study was the coverage of two massacres - the Tiananmen massacre 
(1989) in China and the Kwangju massacre (1980) in South Korea. The two massacres were 
a result of a government crackdown on pro-democracy activists who had gathered to demand 
political reform. Both movements were remarkably similar in that both were student-led and 
enjoyed popular support. Both these movements culminated in massacres where government 
troops used excessive force, causing a high number of civilian casualties. 
The US government responded to the Kwangju massacre by labeling the movement as 
a threat to regional security and stability. This move mirrored the US support for the 
government of Gen. Doo Hwan Chun. In the aftermath of the massacre, the US increased 
development aid and provided military support to suppress the movement (Kim, 2000). These 
measures were taken because South Korea is an ally that hosts a military base for the US 
armed forces. 
The US government responded to the Tiananmen massacre differently. At the time, 
China's communist ideology and its closed market economy were viewed with suspicion, and 
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China was also seen as posing a military threat to the US. The movement in China was 
painted as being humane and as advocating basic human rights. The US supported the 
demonstrators and severely criticized China for the massacre (Kim, 2000). The massacre was 
used to support the view that the communist regime was "oppressive," "inhumane" and "evil" 
to a certain degree. 
Mirroring the government's foreign policy, US news reports about the Kwangju 
massacre frequently quoted Korean government sources and portrayed the movement 
negatively. Symbolic terms such as "turmoil," "rebellion," and "riot" were used whose negative 
connotations describe the inherently unfavorable US stance toward forces that may unsettle a 
diplomatic ally (Kim, 2000). 
On the other hand, the US news media's coverage of the Tiananmen Square massacre 
cited US government sources and portrayed the movement positively as a "student led pro~ 
democracy movement." The media condemned China for the massacre with headlines such as 
"White House condemns China murder." The media also quoted the demonstrators more and ,_ 
Chinese government officials less. 
This could have resulted from the fact that the military government came down hard 
on the press and censored it in Kwangju. On the other hand, several international journalists 
who were in Beijing to cover the meeting of Russian President Gorbachev and the Chinese 
Chairman witnessed the Tiananmen Square massacre, making censorship difficult. The extent 
to which media coverage varied in the two instances is an indicator of how pressures of 
interest groups such as the government can affect news coverage of international conflicts. ~ 
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MEDIA FRAMES AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Media frames as independent variables have been found to have an impact on 
attitudes, opinions and individual frames. In an exploratory analyses of media frames Entman 
( 1993) identified five traits of media texts that set a certain frame of reference, and therefore, 
have a critical impact on information processing: ( 1) importance judgment; ( 2) agency; ( 3) 
identification with victims; ( 4) categorization and (5) generalization to a broader national 
context. 
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet fighter plane shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, 
killing its 269 passengers and crew. On July 3, 1988, a US Navy ship, the Vincennes, shot 
down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 people. In both cases, military officials identified the 
passenger plane as a possibly hostile target. In both cases, too, the perpetrating nation's 
officials claimed that the shooting was justifiable under the circumstances (Entman, 1993 ). In 
the case of the KAL downing, the media emphasized the "moral bankruptcy and guilt" of the 
perpetrating nation. In the case of Iran Air, the media deemphasized guilt and focused on the 
complexity of operating the highly technical military war machine. 
Entman (1993), in an analysis of Time and Newsweek magazines, CBS news, the New 
York Times and the Washington Post, found that the downing of KAL was given almost 
twice the importance as the Iran Air accident. KAL was configured to be the larger of the two 
tragedies and for every one story on the Iran Air tragedy, there were two stories about the 
KAL tragedy. Thus, it was clear that by magnifying or shrinking elements of depicted reality, 
news reporters can make them more or less salient. 
The media portrayed the downing of KAL as another instance of "Soviet evil" and as 
a callous act of violence, confirming established moral assessments of the USSR. Headlines 
read "A ruthless ambush in the sky," "Atrocities in the skies, Soviets down a civilian airliner," 
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among others. Not the pilot of the fighter plane, but the entire Soviet government was held 
responsible for this "reprehensible act." In contrast, in news coverage of the downing of Iran 
Air, the agency was obscured and the passive voice and abstract language were used. Not who 
did wrong, but what went wrong was the tone of the news stories. The incident was justified 
due to the difficulties and complexities of operating complex military machinery and the lack 
of information. 
Furthermore, the KAL victims were humanized in the media using pictures of the 
victims and their grieving relatives. The news stories also carried detailed narratives of what it 
was like for the passengers of the KAL and what they must have been doing before being 
"blown out of the sky." Such emotionally charged frames made the audiences identify more 
closely with the victims, causing them to be appalled at Soviet brutality. In contrast, the Iran 
Air victims were much less visible. The story was given much more of a technical frame. 
The US press categorized the KAL incident as a deliberate criminal attack by the "evil 
communists." Other reports described it as "brutal," "barbaric" and "wanton" and directly 
implied Soviet guilt. The Iran Air tragedy, on the other hand, was categorized as an "accident 
and a tragedy," and was attributed to human error and labeled as "understandable but tragic." 
Cohen ( 1963), in a study exploring the relationship between the media and US foreign 
policy, and Chang ( 1993) in his study of the press and US policy toward China, contend that 
the media work closely with the foreign policy apparatus of the US government and almost 
routinely supported American policy goals. The framing of these two incidents seem to 
support his contention. 
Indeed "what we know about the nature of the social world depends upon how we 
frame and interpret the cues we receive about that world" (Edelman, 1993, p. 231) because 
media frames are likely to influence people's understanding of social issues. According to 
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Huang (1996), media frames and individual frames many times overlap, and when this 
happens, the audience may accord different weights to those frames. Iyengar ( 1991) adds that 
the relationship between media frames and audience frames may also be dependent on the 
issue under study. 
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the foregoing literature review and on an historical analysis of the diplomatic 
relationships among India, Pakistan and the US detailed in Chapter 2, this study asks: 
RQ 1. What was the geographical arena and country focus of the editorials? Did these 
differ before and after 9/11? 
RQ 2: What were the frames used by the New York Times in its editorial coverage of 
India and Pakistan? Did the frames vary before and after 9/11? 
RQ 3: What was the general orientation of the editorials regarding India and Pakistan? 
Were they favorable, against or neutral toward India and/or Pakistan? 
Hypothesis 3a: The New York Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan will be 
mostly negative in tone before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
Hypothesis 3b: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 2001 
will be highly critical of Pakistan. 
Hypothesis Jc: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 2001 will 
be less critical and more supportive of Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 3d: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary significantly in 
their tone toward India before and after September 11, 2001. 
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RQ 4: How did the New York Times editorials portray US relations with India and 
Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypothesis 4a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 
2001 will portray US relations with Pakistan as cold and strained. 
Hypothesis 4b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 
2001 will portray US relations with Pakistan as warm and close. 
Hypothesis 4c: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary 
significantly and will portray US relations with India as warm and close before and 
after September 11 , 2001 . 
RQ 5: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US relations with India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypothesis 5a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 
2001 will be more unsupportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 
2001 will be more supportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5c: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of closer 
relations between the United States and India before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
RQ 6: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US policy regarding India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypotheses 6a: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of the US 
policy toward Pakistan before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
Hypotheses 6b: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of the US 




This study investigates how US media coverage of India and Pakistan varies with the 
US policy toward the two countries over time. A longitudinal study of the coverage of India 
and Pakistan in an elite newspaper, the New York Times, was juxtaposed against the 
trajectory of US foreign policy evident from the Congressional Records. Two coders who 
received extensive training on how to code the categorical and ordinal variables assisted in 
this study. 
The history of US foreign policy toward India and Pakistan has been outlined in 
Chapter 2. This chapter details the procedures necessary to identify the frames used by the 
New York Times in portraying India and Pakistan and how the paper's coverage of the two 
countries may have differed before and after the September 11 attacks. 
To tease out the frames in The New York Times' editorial coverage of India and 
Pakistan, an analysis of the manifest and latent content of editorials published from December 
1998 to June 2004 was conducted. That is, the obvious and embedded meanings of the text 
were analyzed to identify the frames. US policy toward the two countries was determined 
through a qualitative review of policy documents published by the Congressional Research 
Service ( CRS) Library and were synthesized in Chapter 2. 
THE SAMPLE 
The New York Times was chosen not only due to its extensive coverage of foreign and 
domestic issues, but also due to its prominence and influence on national decision making 
(Modern Media Institute, 1983 ). The Times has been described as "a premiere member of the 
elite press" that "plays an influential role in informing American leaders and interested 
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members of the citizenry on international affairs" (Malek, 1997, p. 228). Among national 
newspapers, it is one of the most widely read by policy makers, diplomats, journalists, and the 
public (Cohen, 1960; Graber 1980), and has been shown to influence the content of other 
newspapers, wire services, news magazines, television, and radio news (Gitlin, 1980). It is 
argued that the Times "may not be a bad indicator of the general thrust of news" that reaches 
the US public (Page & Shapiro, 1984, p. 641). The Times has also been identified as a news 
outlet that would be "resistant to pressures to publish the daily messages of the establishment" 
(Bennett, 1988, p. 94). 
The unit of analysis for this study is the complete editorial to be found in the op-ed 
pages. Editorials, not news articles, were chosen as the unit of analysis because they tend to 
better reflect the newspaper's position on any given issue. A far cry from straight news, 
opinion pieces, such as editorials, are free from the formal rules of news writing and "present 
the press' view of contemporary issues" (Chang, 1993, p. 225). Journalistic routine and ideals 
result in a conscious effort by journalists to submit balanced news reports. Editorials, on the 
other hand, are by their very nature, highly opinionated and likely to take a stand. Editorials 
direct public attention to a particular course of action preferred by the newspaper (Chang, 
1993). In a study of the press coverage of Sino-American relations, Chang ( 1993) found that 
editorials were consistently supportive of the government's approach to dealing with China. 
He also found editorials more likely to influence public opinion than newspaper articles, and 
are more likely to provide further evidence for Schettler's ( 1960) claim that editorials were 
"often made to influence public opinion by either interpreting the news in a certain way or by 
arguing for a particular stand on a controversial question" (p. 210). 
The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing declaration of 
a "war on terrorism" mark a watershed event in US foreign policy. The war on terrorism 
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required a realignment of US global policy priorities and objectives. This change was most 
apparent in the case of Pakistan, a nation that went overnight from being a "pariah state" to 
"the most allied of [American] allies" (Feinstein, 2002, p. 5). To determine if there was a 
consequent shift in editorial stance, this study analyzes the content of New York Times 
editorials 33 months before and after 9/11. Thus, the study period encompasses December 12, 
1998 to June 11, 2004. The universe of this study, therefore, is all editorials published in the 
Times within this time period that mentioned India, Pakistan or both. 
The Lexis~Nexis database was used to collect the editorials following these parameters. 
First, a guided news search was performed for all editorials published using the search terms 
"Pakistan and not India," "India and not Pakistan," and "India and Pakistan." The search 
yielded a total of 318 editorials that were downloaded, indexed and saved on a local computer. 
The indexed editorials were then placed in an online archive, accessible to the author and the 
coders via the Internet. 
CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
This study aims to find out ( 1) how the Times editorials framed India and Pakistan, 
( 2) the editorial tone toward the two countries, ( 3) the portrayal of US policy toward the two 
countries, and ( 4) the editorial attitude toward US policy toward and relations with India and 
Pakistan. 
RQ 1. What was the geographical arena and country focus of the editorials? Did these 
differ before and after 9/11? 
The geographic arena of the editorial refers to the broad geographic concentration of 
the editorial. It seeks to find out if the editorials discussed India, Pakistan or both as part of 
primarily international issues or as part of discussions about US or national issues. The 
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editorials were categorized as falling under one of the following arenas: ( 1) international with 
no significant US component, (2) international with significant US component, (3) national 
with no significant international component, and ( 4) national with significant international 
component. 
The editorials that comprised the sample were selected because they mentioned India, 
Pakistan or both. The country focus of the editorial was defined to get a better picture of the 
relative importance of either country in each of the editorials; i.e., did the editorials mostly 
focus on Pakistan or on India ? 
RQ 2: What were the frames used by the New York Times in its editorial coverage of 
India and Pakistan over a five and a half-year period? 
Framing refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of perceived 
reality, enhancing the salience of an interpretation or evaluation of that reality. Frames are 
organized beliefs and strategies that orient individuals to certain perspectives. To frame, as an 
action, is to "participate in public debate strategically" (Pan & Kosicki, 2001 ). Editorials 
actively engage in such a public debate by framing issues and actors in many ways (that is, by 
using multiple frames) to better articulate the argument presented. These multiple frames also 
provide the readers with a variety of perspectives and lead to a more complex cognitive schema 
or understanding about the issue or event being discussed. 
The seven mutually exclusive, non-directional frame categories identified for use in 
this study are: ( 1) socio-economic, ( 2) political, ( 3) religion, ( 4) terrorism, ( 5) nuclear 
proliferation, (6) Kashmir, and (7) conflict frames. Coders were provided with an "other" 
category to indicate the presence of frames that might fall outside of these seven frame 
categories. 
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Each editorial was examined to identify three kinds of frames based on the intensity 
with which they were used in each editorial: ( 1) the focal frame, (2) the complementary 
frame, and (3) the supplementary frame. The focal frame is the central organizing idea of the 
editorial. Categorically, it is the chief frame used to analyze an event or issue. 
Complementary and supplementary frames are rhetorical constructs that better 
articulate the editorial argument. Conceptually they act as support structures for the main 
editorial argument. Complementary frames provide support for the focal frame. A 
supplementary frame is one that expands on the significance of a focal frame by presenting a 
counter-point to the focal and complementary frames. 
Therefore, the editorials can be said to have a focal frame that represents the main 
argument. Each editorial has a focal frame. The writer may choose to further bolster the 
argument by providing a frame that complements the focal frame. In some rare cases, the 
writer may complicate the main argument by presenting a counter argument or a 
supplementary frame. 
For instance, an editorial may say that Pakistan has been an invaluable ally in the fight 
on terrorism, a statement that can be categorized as using terrorism as the focal frame that 
reflects positively on Pakistan for being a US ally. The editorial might bolster this main 
argument by adding that Pakistan has helped apprehend several dozen terrorists, a 
complementary frame that also uses the terrorism category. However, the editorial may 
mention that Pakistan is still under dictatorial governance and diplomatic institutions are 
being corroded by the current political system. This would serve as a supplementary frame that 
uses the political frame and complicates or adds a new dimension to the main argument 
presented in the focal and complementary frames. 
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THE FRAMES 
The seven mutually exclusive, non-directional frame categories identified in the in-
depth analysis of editorials were as follows: 
Socio-economic frame. This frame encompasses discussions about education, health 
care, social justice, law and order, and social mobility. This frame also covers references to 
economic prosperity, economic growth, economic systems, foreign aid, the national budget, 
domestic and foreign trade, and business news. 
Political frame. Editorials were identified as using the political frame if they referenced 
issues such as the forms of government in India and/or Pakistan, national politics in both 
countries (including elections or military coups), bilateral diplomatic relations between India, 
Pakistan, and the United States, and political speeches or initiatives. 
Religion frame. This frame includes discussions about events, actors, issues and 
movements that are associated with organized religion. 
Terrorism frame. The presence of this frame indicates discussion or mention of acts of 
terrorism, the causes of and the perpetrators and/or the victims. 
Nuclear proliferation frame. When the editorial mentions or references issues 
regarding nuclear tests, nuclear weapons and their development, nuclear technology transfers, 
missile proliferation, missile tests, military budgets and other related issues, it was categorized 
under this frame. 
Kashmir frame. This frame deals with the conflict in and over Kashmir. Discussion of 
the parties involved in the conflict, the human cost of the conflict, and the regional and 
global implications of the conflict constitute this frame. 
Conflict frame. This frame includes discussions about all conflicts involving India and 
Pakistan, but excluding the conflict in Kashmir. This frame was selected if the editorial 
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discusses the conflict between India and Pakistan but does not mention Kashmir as an 
integral part of the conflict. 
Other. In case a frame cannot be classified under any of the above mentioned frame 
categories, they were placed under this category. 
RQ 3: What was the general orientation of the editorials regarding India and Pakistan? 
Are they favorable, against or neutral toward India and/or Pakistan? 
Hypothesis 3a: The New York Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan will be 
mostly negative in tone before and after September 11 , 2000. 
Hypothesis 3b: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 2001 
will be highly critical of Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 3c: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 2001 will 
be less critical and more supportive of Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 3d: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary significantly in 
their tone toward India before and after September 11 , 2001. 
Frames are categorical and are not defined as having a valence. But because this study 
also aims to examine how the authors of the editorials framed India, Pakistan and US policy 
toward these two South Asian countries, the tone or direction of editorials toward India and 
Pakistan and the US foreign policy toward them was also ascertained. 
Every identified frame - whether it is focal, complementary, or supplementary- was 
coded in terms of its tone. The tone or valence of a frame refers to the extent to which the 
frame reflects positively or negatively on India or Pakistan or the US foreign policy regarding 
these two countries. For instance, the coverage of successful democratic national elections and 
a military coup can emphasize the political frame. However, these two frames may differ in 
tone. Democratic elections reflect positively on a country whereas a military coup can be seen 
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as a negative development. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the tone of a frame can be 
positive, neutral, or negative toward the country under consideration. Following the 
procedures used by Chang ( 1993) and Budd et al. ( 1970), the tone of a frame was coded on a 
three-point scale, where a positive or favorable disposition was coded a 1, a neutral stance was 
coded a 2 and a negative or unfavorable disposition or direction was coded as 3. When 
present, the complementary frame will have a tone or valence in the same direction as that of 
the focal frame. If the focal frame is positive, the complementary frame will be positive; if the 
focal frame is negative, the complementary frame will be negative as well. However, if the focal 
frame is neutral, the complementary frame could be positive or negative. 
The supplementary frame is a directional variable that problemetizes the editorial 
argument by presenting categorical frames in a tonal direction that is opposite that of the focal 
frame and the complementary frames. If the focal frame and complementary frame are positive, 
the supplementary frame will be negative. If the focal frame and complementary frame are 
negative, the supplementary frame will be positive. 
When the issue at hand reflects positively or favorably on the country of focus, the 
tone of the frame was assigned a score of 1. If the frame reflects negatively or unfavorably on 
the country of focus, the tone was assigned a score of 3. When the distinction is difficult to 
make, the tone was assigned a score of 2. Each of the seven frames identified were evaluated in 
terms of its tone or valence as follows: 
Socio~economic frame. Among the positive reflectors of this frame are references to 
free market economies, conditions conducive for US business opportunities, the presence of a 
large consumer base, prevalence of social justice, law and order, health programs, access to 
education and gainful employment. Negative reflectors include most references to the AIDS 
crisis, low social mobility, poverty, illiteracy, weak social or economic institutions, and a 
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controlled economy. Issues such as the growth of the information technology industry in 
India, and the setting up of call centers and other "back,office" operations for US companies 
may be covered in a positive or negative tone and were coded accordingly. 
Political frame. In general, democracy and democratic processes were classified as 
being positive aspects of this frame. Other positive indicators include mention of support for 
the US war on terror, support for US initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq, diplomatic 
initiatives, and speeches calling for peace. Anti,democratic processes were classified as 
negative, along with opposition to US military initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq, "jingoism" 
and angry rhetoric in political speeches. 
Religion frame. Mention of a country's religious tolerance, religious freedom, religious 
diversity, or religious celebration were coded as positive and coded as 1. Mention of Hindu 
nationalism, Hindu fundamentalism, the caste system, Islamic fundamentalism, radicalization 
of Islam, violence against Christians, violence against religious minorities, violence against 
Muslims, violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims, growth of Jihadi organizations, religious 
intolerance, and discrimination based on religion were considered negative and coded as 3. 
When the discussion was very general and could not be classified as being positive or negative, 
it was categorized as neutral and assigned a value of 2. 
Terrorism frame. When a country was portrayed as a victim of terrorism or an ally in 
the war on terrorism, the tone was seen as positive. When a country was portrayed as 
supporting terrorism, the tone was seen as negative. If the country of focus is portrayed as a 
reluctant ally in the war against terrorism, the frame was coded as neutral. Additionally, 
references to the militancy in Kashmir as being a form of state,sponsored cross,border 
terrorism was viewed in this study as a positive for India and a negative for Pakistan. 
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References to the militants as part of an indigenous armed struggle were seen as a negative for 
India and a positive for Pakistan. 
Nuclear proliferation frame. In general, an editorial was coded as having a positive 
tone when it mentioned a country's acquiescence to inspections of its nuclear facilities by 
international organizations, or when a country was portrayed as a signatory to international 
treaties limiting nuclear and missile proliferation. The editorial was coded as having a negative 
tone when it mentions the development and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, 
high military spending, reluctance to sign international treaties limiting nuclear and missile 
proliferation, the sale or transfer of nuclear technology or weapons, the lack of a nuclear 
command structure, and vulnerable nuclear or fissile materials. 
Kashmir frame. If the country was portrayed as a victim in the Kashmir conflagration, 
is portrayed as responsible, and lauded for making rapprochements for the peaceful settlement 
of the conflict, promoting democracy, or as being morally in the right, the editorial tone was 
coded as positive. If, however, a country was discussed as being the aggressor, oppressive, 
irresponsible, irrational, as abusing human rights, supporting the insurgency, or inflaming the 
conflict in anyway, the frame was coded as having a negative tone. If the discussion is very 
general, mentioned Kashmir as a zone of conflict and could not be classified as being positive 
or negative in its reflection on the country of focus, it was coded as being neutral. 
Conflict frame. If the country was portrayed in the editorial as a victim, making 
rapprochements for the peaceful settlement of the conflict, promoting democracy, or as being 
morally in the right, the editorial tone was seen as positive. If however, a country is discussed 
as being the aggressor, irresponsible, irrational, as abusing human rights, supporting 
insurgency, or inflaming a conflict in anyway, the frame was coded as having a negative 
valence. 
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RQ 4: How did the New York Times editorials portray US relations with India and 
Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypothesis 4a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 
2001 will portray US relations with Pakistan as cold and strained. 
Hypothesis 4b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11 , 
2001 will portray US relations with Pakistan as warm and close. 
Hypothesis 4c: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary 
significantly and portray US relations with India as warm and close before and 
after September 11 , 2001 . 
The portrayal of US relations with India and/or Pakistan refers to how the author of 
the editorial portrays the relationship between the US and the two South Asian countries. 
The absence of direct communication between the government and citizens with regards to 
foreign policy elevates the importance of the editorials as a source of information about this 
important dimension of foreign relations. If the coders detected that US relations with either 
country were portrayed as congenial, warm, or close, the variable was coded as 1. If the US 
relations with either country were portrayed as tense, cold, or strained, it was coded as 2. If the 
editorial made no mention of US relations with either countries or if they were not able to 
gauge clearly how the editorial portrayed US relations, the variable was coded as 3. 
RQ 5: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US relations with India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypothesis 5a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 
2001 will be more unsupportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 
2001 will be more supportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
47 
Hypothesis 5c: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of closer 
relations between the United States and India before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
The editorial attitude toward US relations with India and Pakistan is defined as the 
editorial's response, whether favorable or unfavorable, toward US relations with either of the 
two countries. The editorial was considered supportive of closer US relations with India or 
Pakistan when it described the relationship as desirable, important or vital to US national 
interests. When the editorial was apprehensive of US relations with either country, it was 
considered unsupportive. When the editorial did not indicate a clear direction or preference, 
it was considered as neutral. 
RQ 6: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US policy regarding India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypotheses 6a: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of the US 
policy toward Pakistan before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
Hypotheses 6b: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of 
the US policy toward India before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
The editorial attitude toward US policy regarding India and Pakistan is defined as the 
editorial stance, whether favorable or unfavorable, to US foreign policy initiatives vis-a-vis the 
two countries. When the editorials praised or approved of the US policy toward India or 
Pakistan, it was considered as being supportive of US foreign policy. When the editorial was 
apprehensive and questioned US policy toward either of the two countries, it was seen as 
critical and unfavorable. When the editorials did not indicate a clear direction or preference, it 
was considered neutral. 
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STATISTICAL METHODS 
Descriptive analyses of frequency and cross tabulations were used to answer the 
research questions. The independent variable for this study has been operationally defined as a 
nominal dummy variable that identifies whether or not the unit of analysis was published 
before September 11, 2001. 
The dependent variables were all nominal and included the following: ( 1) the 
geographic arena of the editorial, (2) the country of focus, (3) the focal frame of the editorial, 
( 4) the tone of the focal frame, ( 5) the complementary frame, ( 6) the supplementary frame, 
( 7) the historical context frame, ( 8) sources quoted, ( 9) editorial tone toward Pakistan, ( 10) 
editorial tone toward India, ( 11) portrayal of US relations with Pakistan, ( 12) portrayal of US 
relations with India, ( 13) editorial tone toward US relations with Pakistan, ( 14) editorial 
tone toward US relations with India, (15) editorial tone toward US policy regarding Pakistan, 
and ( 16) editorial tone toward US policy regarding India. 
A Pearson chi-square test statistic (x2) was used for each cross-tabulation as a test of 
association. The test statistic, degrees of freedom and p-value are reported for each cross 
tabulation. When chi-squared tests provided evidence against overall independence, implying 
an association, adjusted residuals were used as a measure of both strength and pattern for all 
significant associations. Adjusted residual values between two and three were considered as 
notable whereas values above three as very significant. All statistical analyses were conducted 
with an alpha level of 0.05. 
CODING AND TRAINING OF CODERS 
Coding is the process by which the coder uses content categories to analyze the unit of 
analysis. A team of two coders used a 28-item code sheet to analyze the 318 editorials. The 
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code sheet (Appendix A) was made available in print as well as electronic format. The two 
coders were trained for a period of 10 hours. 
The codebook contains the codes for the 28~item questionnaire. It provided 
definitions for the various frames and categories, and served as a guide to the coding process. 
A program called "Survey" was used to duplicate the code sheet on to a webpage. The coders 
accessed this online version of the code sheet via the Internet. Once coding was finished, the 
data were retrieved from the program server as a text file, imported into Microsoft Excel, and 
then imported into SPSS for analysis. 
so 
CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This study investigates the relationship between the US policies in India and Pakistan 
and the New Yark Times' editorial coverage of the two South Asian countries over a five and 
a half year period. Using both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, this study 
aims to provide evidence supporting the theory that international news coverage is often 
determined by considerations of international diplomacy. By analyzing US relations and 
foreign policy toward India and Pakistan and then comparing it to the Times' editorial 
coverage of the two countries, this study provides evidence that suggests foreign policy shaped 
the Times' portrayals of India and Pakistan. 
A Lexis~Nexis search of New York Times editorials published from December 12, 1998 
through June 11, 2004 that mentioned India and Pakistan yielded a total of 318 editorials. 
The editorials ranged from 215 words to 3,189 words in length, with an average length of 713 
words. Of the sample, 100 editorials were published between December 12, 1998 and 
September 11, 2001 (average length = 64 7 .6 words); and a total of 218 editorials were 
published between September 12, 2001 and June 11, 2004 (average length= 743.6 words). 
The editorials after 9/11 were therefore longer than the ones before 9/11. 
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One of two coders in this study was a graduate student in journalism and mass 
communication; the other was a freshman in the college of liberal arts and sciences. Both 
coders were US citizens, had not visited India or Pakistan, and have had no direct links to 
either of the two countries. 
INTERCODER RELIABILITY 
The nature of data analysis necessitated that the coders agree in their responses and 
make reliable judgments about categories, frames and their meanings. "Intercoder reliability 
refers to the levels of agreement among independent coders who code the same content using 
the same coding instrument" (Wimmer, 2003, p. 156). Because the coding instrument for this 
study collected nominal data, the intercoder reliability was calculated using Holsti's (1969) 
formula: 
where Mis the coding decisions on which the two coders agreed, and N 1 and N 2 are the total 
number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively. 
The two coders for this study were asked to read 23 editorials that were part of the non-
sample data, and use the online survey tool to enter the codes. Intercoder reliability was 
calculated for 12 variables in the study using Holsti's formula. The average intercoder 
reliability for the 12 variables varied from 0.70 to 1.00. Three variables were in the lower 
range: editorial tone toward India (0. 74), editorial attitude toward US relations with India 
(0.74), and editorial attitude toward US policy regarding Pakistan (0.70). Five variables were in 
the middle range: identification of complementary frame (0.82), editorial tone toward Pakistan 
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(0.82), editorial portrayal of US relations with Pakistan (0.87), editorial portrayal of US 
relations with Pakistan (0.82) and editorial attitude toward US policy regarding India (0.87). 
Four variables were in the upper range: identification of the focal frame (0.95), tone of focal 
frame (0.95), identification of the supplementary frame (0.95), and editorial portrayal of US 
relations with India (1.00). These coefficients of agreement were considered acceptable, 
especially for the directional variables dealing with tone, attitude or portrayal since the coders 
never disagreed by more than one unit on a three-point scale. The disagreements in most cases 
moved from directional values to the neutral one. 
TABLE 5.2. INTERCODER RELIABILTY TEST RESULTS 
~ ~ 
Attitude toward US policy toward Pakistan •••"'117'1· ,..  . ".,' .< •...• .)> •• l'lt•1,;"llLl···llllfJlllllllBll 
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This exploratory study aims to identify frames used most often in the Times' editorial 
coverage of India and Pakistan. It also inquired about how the frequency of use of these frames 
varied before and after September 11, 2001. To answer the research questions, coders were 
asked to identify the geographic arena the editorial was concerned with, the country of focus, 
the focal frame, the complementary frame, and the supplementary frame used, and the use of 
historical background in the commentary. 
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RQ 1. What was the geographical arena and country focus of the editorials? Did these 
differ before and after 9/11? 
The coders were first asked to identify the geographic focus or arena of the editorial 
(Table 3). The coders identified 1 7 .3 % ( 5 5) of the editorials as being international in focus 
with little or no mention of the United States. They found that 62.8% ( 199) of the editorials 
were international in focus with a significant US component and 16. 7% ( 53 editorials) 
focused on the US but also had an international component. Only 3.1 % (10) of the editorials 
were about the United States with little or no significant international component. These 
statistics shows that, under the parameters of the study, most editorials mentioned a US 
component in their discussion of India, Pakistan or both. 
FIGURE 5.1. THE GEOGRAPHIC ARENA OF EDITORIALS 
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70 
Ill 60 1 iii 50 + "i: 




~ Q 10 ........... ____ J.Q 
0 @gffil@Wf;Wf ' 
International International National with National with 
with no with significant no significant 
significant US significant US international international 
component component component component 
Note: The numbers on top of the bars represent the actual count of the editorials under each category. 
To see if the arena of the editorials varied significantly before and after September 11, 
2001, a cross tabulation count and a chi-square test were performed. The Pearson chi-square 
result (x2=4.187, p=0.242) revealed no significant difference in the arena of the editorials 
before and after September 11, 2001. 
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TABLE 5.3. GEOGRAPHIC ARENA OF EDITORIALS 
Arena* Before 9/11 317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Chi-S uare Tests 
Pearson Chi-Square 3 
a. 1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.15. 
The coders were then asked to identify the country of focus for the editorials. Was the 
editorial primarily about India or was it about Pakistan? Or were the countries merely 
mentioned without any substantial discussion? This variable sought to identify, on a 
comparative basis, the country that was more talked about in the editorial coverage and to see 
if the coverage varied before and after September 11, 2001. 
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Note: The numbers on top of the bars represent the actual count of the editorials under each category. 
Most editorials ( 40. 7%) mentioned both India and Pakistan. Close to 20% ( 62 
editorials) focused exclusively on Pakistan and 10. 7% (34 editorials) focused exclusively on 
India. Almost 13 % ( 41 editorials) were mostly about Pakistan and mentioned India, 
compared to 5.4% (17 editorials) that were mostly about India but mentioned Pakistan. 
Curiously, 5.4% ( 1 7 editorials) only mentioned Pakistan and another 5.4% ( 1 7 editorials) 
only mentioned India. 
To see if the country focus of the editorials varied significantly before and after 
September 11, 2001, a cross tabulation count and a chi,square test were performed. The 
Pearson chi,square result (x2= 16.14 7, p=0.013) revealed a significant difference in the country 
of focus of the editorials before and after September 11, 2001. 
The number of editorials that were about Pakistan and not India increased 
significantly from 12 editorials (12 % ) , to 50 editorials ( 23 % ) after September 11, 2001. 
56 
TABLE 5.4. COUNTRY FOCUS OF THE EDITORIALS 
Country of focus 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
317 99.7% 
1 
















a. O cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.36. 
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The significance of this increase was indicated in the absolute adjusted residual value of 
2.3. The other category that was of particular interest, with an absolute adjusted residual of 
3.3, was the one that accounted for number of editorials that mentioned both India and 
Pakistan. This category that had previously accounted for 54.0% of the editorials, accounted 
for just 34.6% of the editorials after September 11. 
The results indicate that the Times featured or mentioned Pakistan more than India 
in its editorial coverage. Comparing the coverage before and after September 11, it would seem 
that the Times shifted in its tendency of mentioning both India and Pakistan in the editorial 
toward having the editorial focused exclusively on Pakistan. This may be a clear reflection of 
the new role Pakistan took on after September 11, serving as a "key" ally and base for US 
military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan. 
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RQ 2: What were the frames used by the New York Times in its editorial coverage of 
India and Pakistan? Did the frames vary before and after 9/11? 
What were the broad categories under which India and Pakistan were discussed in the 
editorials? To answer this, the coders were asked to identify the focal frame, the 
complementary frame and the supplementary frame in each of the editorials. 
The study found the presence of a focal frame along with a complementary and 
supplementary frame in only 10.72% of the editorials examined. Almost 33% of the editorials 
had a complementary frame accompanying the focal frame, whereas 56.46% of the editorials 
did not have a complementary or a supplementary frame accompanying the focal frame. 
Overall, the editorials featured the following frames in descending order of frequency: 
( 1) the political frame, (2) the socio~economic frame, (3) nuclear proliferation frame, ( 4) 
terrorism frame, and ( 5) the conflict frame, followed by ( 6) the religion frame. 
To see if the focal frame varied significantly before and after September 11, 2001, a 
cross tabulation count and a chi~square test were performed. The Pearson chi~square result 
(x2=16.826, p=0.019) revealed a significant difference in the focal frame of the editorials 
before and after September 11, 2001. Adjusted residuals were used as a measure of which 
categories of focal frames varied significantly. Political frames, with an absolute adjusted 
residual value of 2.1, and the terrorism frame category, which had an absolute adjusted residual 
value of 2.2, were two categories of interest. Evidently, the percentage of editorials using a 
political focal frame went down from 36.0% to 24.4%. This drop was accompanied with a rise 
in the use of the terrorism frame (from 6.0% to 14. 7%) as the focal frame in editorials. 
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TABLE 5.5. FOCAL FRAMES USED IN THE EDITORIALS 
Focal Frame 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Total Count 100 
100.0 
217 317 
" a:oo ~ o 
100.0 100.0 
a. 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58. 
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How often did the editorials make use of complementary frames? Did the 
complementary frames present in the editorials also show similar and significant variance? 
To answer these questions, a cross tabulation count and a chi,square test were 
performed. The Pearson chi,square result (x2=20.235, p=0.009) revealed a significant 
difference in the complementary frames used in the editorials before and after September 11, 
2001. Adjusted residuals were used as a measure of which categories of complementary frames 
varied significantly. 
Of the editorials analyzed, 54% ( 171 editorials) did not have a detectable 
complementary frame. The possibility of finding an editorial that did not have a discemable 
complementary frame varied slightly before (51 % ) and after (56.3%) 9/11. From the editorials 
that did have a complementary frame, the terrorism frame, with an absolute adjusted residual 
value of 3.2, and the Kashmir frame with an absolute adjusted residual value of 2.3 were two 
categories that displayed significant variance in occurrence after September 11, 2001. The 
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number of editorials using terrorism as a complementary frame increased from 0 to 20 (9.4%). 
As this happened, the percent of editorials using Kashmir as a complementary frame dropped 
from 7.0% (7 editorials) to 1.9% (4 editorials). 
This variance is of particular interests as it implies that after September 11, editorials 
actively used the terrorism frame as a complementary frame in its portrayal of India and 
Pakistan. At the same time, it reduced references to Kashmir as support for the focal argument 
and thus the Kashmir frame was allowed to slide back in prominence. This may be explained 
by the fact that after 9/11, more editorials used a "war on terrorism" perspective when 
mentioning India and Pakistan. The decline in the use of the Kashmir frame may have been a 
result of the need to bolster Pakistani's positive image after it had been declared a major ally 
against terrorism. 
A cross tabulation count and a chi~square test were performed to see if the 
supplementary frame displayed any variance after September 11, 2001. The Pearson chi~square 
result (x2=6.858, p=0.334) revealed no significant difference in the supplementary frames used 
in the editorials published before and after September 11, 2001. 
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TABLE 5.6. THE COMPLEMENTARY FRAMES USED IN THE EDITORIALS 
Case Processing Summary 
Complementary Frame 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Socio-economic 
frame 
313 98.4% 5 1.6% 318 
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TABLE 5.7. THE SUPPLEMENTARY FRAMES USED IN THE EDITORIALS 
Case Processin 
Supplementary Frame 
* Before 9/11 316 
a. 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.58. 
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Did the editorials make use of an historical perspective to provide greater depth and 
understanding of the region in their coverage of India and Pakistan? Did the use of historical 
perspective vary after September 11, 2001? To answer this, a cross tabulation count and a chi, 
square test were performed on the variable that tests for the presence of a historical perspective 
or frame of reference in the editorials. The Pearson chi,square result (x2= 18.132, p=0.000) 
revealed a significant difference in the use of an historical perspective in editorials before and 
after September 11, 2001. 













Present Not present 
Before 9/11 
~'.i' After 9/11 
Note: The numbers on top of the bars represent the actual count of the editorials under each category 
The use of an historical perspective dropped after September 11. The historical 
perspective frame appeared in at least 44% ( 44) of all the editorials before 9/11, but then its 
presence drops to just about 20.8% ( 45) of the editorials after September 11. As a corollary, 
79 .2 % ( 1 71) of the editorials written after 9/11 focusing on India or Pakistan did not provide 
an historical perspective to the content. This indicates that the war on terrorism has 
eliminated the need for an historical basis for editorial discussions because the 9111 attacks 
on US soil happened only four years ago. 
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TABLE 5.8. THE USE OF AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IN THE 
EDITORIALS 
Historical Perspective 
* Before 9/11 316 99.4% 2 .6% 318 100.0% 
Cross Tabulation Count 
% Before 9/11 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 0.000 
a. O cells (0 .0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.16. 
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RQ 3: What was the general orientation of the editorials regarding India and Pakistan? 
Were they favorable, against or neutral toward India and/or Pakistan? 
What was the general tone of the Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan 
before 9/11? Did the editorial tone change after 9/11? To see if the editorial tone toward India 
and Pakistan varied significantly before and after September 11, 2001, cross tabulation counts 
and chi,square tests were performed on the two variables that measured the editorial tones 
toward India and Pakistan respectively. 
Hypothesis 3a: The New York Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan will be 
mostly negative in tone before and after September 11 , 2000. 
Hypothesis 3b: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 2001 
will be highly critical of Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 3c: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 2001 will 
be less critical and more supportive of Pakistan. 
The coders were asked to identify the tone of the focal frame for each editorial and 
ascertain if the general tone of the Times editorial was positive, negative or neutral. 
The study found that about 45% (144 editorials) were unsupportive or negative, 
compared to almost 29% (91 editorials) that were supportive or positive in tone. Almost 23% 
( 72 editorials) were neutral or classifiable as neither positive nor negative. Thus, this is 
evidence to support the statement that the Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan 
was mostly negative in tone. 
67 
FIGURE 5.5. TONE OF THE FOCAL FRAMES USED IN THE EDITORIALS 
70 65 
60 
VI 50 ii 
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Note: The numbers on top of the bars represent the actual count of the editorials under each category. 
A cross tabulation count and a chi,square test were performed to see if the tone of the 
focal frame varied significantly before and after September 11, 2001. The Pearson chi,square 
result (x2=23.254, p=0.000) revealed a significant difference in the tone. 
The percentage of editorials with a positive tone increased from 16% ( 16 editorials) to 
34.6% (75 editorials). The percentage of editorials with a neutral tone also increased from 
17% (17 editorials) to 25.3% (55 editorials). This increases in percentage of editorials with 
positive and neutral tones was accompanied with a significant drop in the percentage of 
editorials with an unsupportive or negative tone. Though the count of editorials with a 
negative tone increased from 65 to 79, it actually corresponded to a significant drop from 65% 
to 36.4%. 
This supports the hypothesis that the Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan 
changed after September 11, 2001. It provides significant evidence that the Times' coverage 
moved from its predominantly negative stance toward India and Pakistan and became more 
positive in its tone when talking about either of the two countries after September 11, 2001. 
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TABLE 5.9. TONE OF THE FOCAL FRAMES USED IN THE EDITORIALS 
Tone of Focal Frame 
* Before 9/11 
Chi-Square Tests 






.3% 318 100.0% 
··············.2:.:shlecn ·>•·.• 
0.000 
a. 1 cell (12.5%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.15. 
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The Pearson chi~square result (x2=40.274, p=0.000) revealed a significant difference in 
the editorial tone toward Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001. The data provides 
significant evidence to support hypothesis 3a that posits that before September 11, 2001, the 
New York Times editorial coverage was highly critical of Pakistan, and hypothesis 3b that 
posits that after 9/11, the editorials published in the Times were less critical and more 
supportive of Pakistan. 
After 9/11, the percentage of editorials that had an unsupportive or negative tone 
toward Pakistan went down from 65% (65 editorials) to 28.6% (62 editorials). Also, the 
percentage of editorials that had a supportive or positive tone toward Pakistan went up from 
just 6% ( 6 editorials), to 23 % ( 50 editorials). The percentage of neutral editorials went up 
from 14% (14 editorials) to 28.6% (57 editorials) after 9/11. 
The "not applicable" category serves as an indicator of how likely it was to find an 
editorial that was not about Pakistan or that the editorial did not carry a detectable tone 
toward the country. 
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TABLE 5.10. EDITORIAL TONE TOWARD PAKISTAN 
Tone toward Pakistan 
* Before 9/11 










.3% 318 100.0% 
a. 0 cells (0 .0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.67. 
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This category experienced an insignificant jump from 15.0% to 22.1 % editorials. This meant 
that it was very slightly more likely to find a detectable editorial tone toward Pakistan after 
9/11. 
The positive, negative and neutral categories, with absolute adjusted residual values of 
3. 7, 6.2, and 2.4, respectively, provide very significant evidence that the Times editorial 
coverage changed in tone toward Pakistan after September 11, 2001. The data further suggests 
that it was less likely to find an editorial that was negative in tone toward Pakistan after 9/11. 
It was also significantly more likely to find editorials that were positive in tone toward 
Pakistan. The likelihood of finding an editorial that was neutral toward Pakistan also 
increased after 9/11 . 
Hypothesis 3d: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary significantly in 
their tone toward India before and after September 11, 2001. 
The Pearson chi,square result (x2= 10.633, p=0.014) revealed a significant difference in 
the editorial coverage of India before and after September 11, 2001. However, there was no 
significant difference in the editorial tone toward India, and this supports the hypothesis that 
the Times' editorial coverage of India would not vary significantly before and after 9/11. 
The percentage of editorials that had a supportive or positive tone toward India went 
down from 28.0% (28 editorials), to 18.4% ( 40 editorials) after September 11. The 
percentage of editorials that had an unsupportive or negative tone toward India went down 
from 20.0% (20 editorials), to 17.5% (38 editorials) after September 11. 
The percentage of neutral editorials also saw a slight decline from 30.0% (30 editorials) 
to 24.0% (52 editorials) after 9/11. Though the editorial coverage varied significantly due to 
the drop in the likelihood of editorials with a detectable tone toward India after 9/11, the tone 
of the editorials did not change significantly. 
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The three categories had absolute adjusted residual values less than 2.0 and were thus not 
varying significantly before and after 9/11. These variances were also not as significant as the 
variances found in the editorial tone toward Pakistan. 
The "not applicable" category indicated the likelihood of finding an editorial that was 
not about India or that the editorial did not carry a detectable tone toward the country. This 
category experienced a very significant jump from 22.0% (22 editorials) to 40.1 % (87 
editorials). This meant that it was much less likely to find a detectable editorial tone toward 
India after 9/11. This may be explained by the fact that after 9/11, the start of US military 
operations in Afghanistan and the US war against terrorism, Pakistan, due to its geographical 
proximity to the region of active combat and due to its role as a key US ally, featured more 
prominently in the editorial coverage than India. 
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TABLE 5.11. EDITORIAL TONE TOWARD INDIA 
Tone toward India 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Chi-S uare Tests 
317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 100.0% 
3 
a. O cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.30. 
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RQ 4: How did the New York Times editorials portray US relations with India and 
Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
What percentage of the editorials actually mentioned US relations or policy toward 
India and Pakistan? Did the editorial coverage vary after 9/11? To answer this question, cross 
tabulation counts and chi,square tests were performed on the two dummy variables that asked 
if the editorial mentioned US relations or policy toward either India or Pakistan. 
The Pearson chi,square result (x2=0.118, p=0.731) revealed no significant difference 
in the presence of a mention of US relation or policy toward Pakistan before and after 
September 11, 2001. This meant that it was just as likely to find a mention of US relations or 
policy toward Pakistan in editorials published before as it was after 9/11. 
However, the Pearson chi,square result (x2=4.543, p=0.033) revealed a significant 
difference in the presence of a mention of US relation or policy toward India before and after 
September 11, 2001. It was more likely to find a mention of US relations or policy toward 
India in editorials published before than after 9/11. As a corollary, it was more likely to find an 
editorial with no mention of US relation or policy toward India after 9/11. India, apparently, 
lost the attention of the US government and the US press. 
Hypothesis 4a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 2001 
will portray US relations with Pakistan as cold and strained. 
Hypothesis 4b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 2001 will 
portray US relations with Pakistan as warm and close. 
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TABLE 5.12. MENTION OF US RELATIONS OR POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN 
Is US relation or policy 
toward Pak mentioned 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
317 
O cells (0.0%) have count 
99.7% 
* Is US relation or policy toward Pakistan mentioned? 
1 .3% 318 100.0% 
76 
TABLE 5.13. MENTION OF US RELATIONS OR POLICY TOWARD INDIA 
Is US relation or policy 
toward India mentioned 
* Before 9/ 11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 100.0% 
O cells (0.0%) have expected count than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.08. 
* Is US relation or policy toward India mentioned? 
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How did the Times' editorials portray US relations with Pakistan before 9/11? Did the 
editorial portrayal of bilateral relations change after 9/11? Cross tabulation counts and chi, 
square tests were used to see if the editorial portrayal of US relations toward Pakistan varied 
significantly before and after September 11, 2001. 
A Pearson chi,square result (x2=75.857, p=0.000) revealed a very significant variance 
in the portrayal of US relations with Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001. The 
percentage of editorials that portrayed US relations with Pakistan as warm and close went up 
from just 8% ( 8 editorials) to 3 7% ( 81 editorials). The percentage of editorials that portrayed 
bilateral relations as cold and strained dropped from 40% (40 editorials) to just 4.6% (10 
editorials). This meant that, compared to before 9/11, it was much more likely to find an 
editorial that portrayed US relations with Pakistan as warm and friendly after 9/11. As a 
corollary, it was more likely to find an editorial that would portray US relations with Pakistan 
as cold and strained before 9/11. Also, the 'not applicable' category did not vary 
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TABLE 5.14. PORTRAYAL OF US RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 
Portrayal US rein Pakistan 
* Before 9/11 
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a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.82. 
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significantly and this meant that it was just as unlikely to find an editorial that mentioned US 
relations with Pakistan before (52%) or after (57.9%) September 11, 2001. 
Thus the data provides evidence to support hypothesis 4a, that states US relations 
with Pakistan will be portrayed as cold and strained before 9/11, and hypothesis 4b, that states 
US relations with Pakistan will be portrayed as warm and friendly after September 11, 2001. 
Hypothesis 4c: Editorials published in the New York Times will not vary significantly and 
portray US relations with India as warm and close before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
How did the Times' editorial portray US relations with India before 9/11? Did the 
editorial portrayal of bilateral relations change after 9/11? Cross tabulation counts and chi~ 
square tests were used to see if the editorial portrayal of US relations toward India varied 
significantly before and after September 11, 2001. 
A Pearson chi~square result (x2=9.558, p=0.008) revealed a significant variance in the 
portrayal of US relations with India before and after September 11, 2001. The percentage of 
editorials that portrayed US relations with India as warm and close dropped from 25% (25 
editorials) to 19% (41 editorials). Also, the percentage of editorials that portrayed bilateral 
relations as cold and strained dropped from 9% ( 9 editorials) to 2.3 % ( 5 editorials). This 
meant that, compared to before 9/11, it was much less likely to find an editorial that portrayed 
US relations with India as cold and strained after 9/11. The "not applicable" category varied 
significantly and this meant that it was less likely to find an editorial that did not mention US 
relations with India before (66%) than after (78.7%) September 11, 2001. Overall, only 1/4rh 
of the editorials actually mentioned US relations with India, and of those, 4/Yh portrayed 
bilateral relations as warm and friendly. 
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TABLE 5.15. PORTRAYAL OF US RELATIONS WITH INDIA 
Portrayal US rein India 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Chi-Square Tests 
•,;> 




a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.43. 
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Note: The numbers on top of the bars represent the actual count of the editorials under each category 
Thus, there is sufficient evidence in support of the hypothesis 4c that posits that 
editorials will portray US relations with India as warm and close before and after September 
11, 2001. 
RQ 5: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US relations with India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Were the editorials supportive or unsupportive of bilateral relations between the US 
and India and between the US and Pakistan? Did the editorial attitude vary after 9/11? To 
answer these questions, cross tabulation counts and chi~square tests were performed on the 
two variables that measured the editorial attitude toward US relations with India and 
Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5a: Editorials published in the New York Times before September 11, 
2001 will be more unsupportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
Hypothesis 5b: Editorials published in the New York Times after September 11, 2001 
will be more supportive of closer US relations with Pakistan. 
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A Pearson chi~square result (x2=29.SS1, p=0.000) revealed a very significant variance 
in the editorials' attitude toward US relations with Pakistan before and after September 11, 
2001. After 9/11, the percentage of editorials that were supportive of closer US relations with 
Pakistan went up from just 14% (14 editorials) to 30% (6S editorials). At the same time, the 
percentage of editorials that were unsupportive or apprehensive of bilateral relations dropped 
very significantly from 26% (26 editorials) to just 6% ( 13 editorials). This meant that, after 
9/11, it was much more likely to find an editorial supportive of closer US relations with 
Pakistan. As a corollary, before 9/11, it was more likely to find an editorial that was 
unsupportive or apprehensive of US relations with Pakistan. The "not applicable" category 
did not vary significantly and this meant that it was just as unlikely to find an editorial that 
had a detectable attitude toward US relations with Pakistan before (S2%) or after (54.4%) 
September 11, 2001. Thus, there was significant evidence to support hypothesis Sa and 
hypothesis Sb. 
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TABLE 5.16. TONE TOWARD US RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 
Tone US rein Pakistan 
* Before 9/ 11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 100.0% 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.15. 
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Hypothesis 5c: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of closer 
relations between the United States and India before and after September 11, 2001. 
What was the editorial attitude toward US relations with India before 9/11? Did the 
attitude toward bilateral relations change after 9/11? Cross tabulation counts and chi~square 
tests were used to see if the editorial attitudes toward US relations with India vary significantly 
before and after September 11, 2001. 
A Pearson chi~square result (x2=6.195, p=0.102) revealed that the variance in the 
editorial attitude toward US relations with India before and after September 11, 2001 was not 
significant. After 9/11, the percentage of editorials that were supportive of closer US relations 
with India went down from 25% (25 editorials) to 15.2% (33 editorials). The percentage of 
editorials that were unsupportive or apprehensive of bilateral relations dropped from 3% (3 
editorials) to 1.4% (3 editorials). These variances were not significant and therefore meant 
that it was just as likely to find an editorial support for closer US relations with India after 
9/11 as before. The "not applicable" category did not vary significantly and this meant that it 
was just as unlikely to find an editorial that had a detectable attitude toward US relations with 
India before ( 66%) as after ( 7 3. 7%) September 11, 2001. Overall, of the editorials that had a 
detectable attitude, it was more likely to find editorials that were supportive of closer US 
relations with India. 
Thus, there is sufficient evidence in support of the hypothesis Sc that posits that the 
editorials published before and after 9/11 were supportive of closer US relations with India. 
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TABLE 5.17. TONE TOWARD US RELATIONS WITH INDIA 
Tone US rein India 
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a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.89. 
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FIGURE 5.11. EDITORIAL TONE TOWARD US RELATIONS WITH INDIA 
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RQ 6: What was the attitude of the editorials published in the New York Times toward 
US policy regarding India and Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001? 
Hypotheses 6a: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of the US 
policy toward Pakistan before and after September 11 , 2001 . 
Hypotheses 6b: Editorials published in the New York Times will be supportive of 
the US policy toward India before and after September 11, 2001. 
What was the editorial attitude toward the US policy regarding Pakistan before 9/11? 
Did the attitude toward US policy change after 9/11? Cross tabulation counts and chi,square 
tests were used to see if the editorial attitude toward US policy regarding Pakistan varied 
significantly before and after September 11, 2001. 
A Pearson chi,square result (x2=4.492, p=0.213) revealed that the variance in the 
editorial attitude toward US policy regarding Pakistan before and after September 11, 2001 
was not significant. The percentage of editorials that supported the US policy toward Pakistan 
dipped slightly from 28% (28 editorials) before 9/11 to 25.8% (56 editorials) after 9/11. 
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The percentage of editorials that were unsupportive of the US policy toward Pakistan also 
went down from 13% (13 editorials) before 9/11 to 6.5% (14 editorials) after 9/11. The "not 
applicable" category did not vary significantly and this meant that it was just as unlikely to 
find an editorial that had a detectable attitude toward US policy regarding Pakistan before 
(49%) as after (54.8%) September 11, 2001. Overall, of the editorials that had a detectable 
attitude, it was more likely to find editorials that were supportive of the US policy toward 
Pakistan. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support hypothesis Sa that posits that the 
editorials published before and after 9/11 were supportive of US policy toward Pakistan. 
What was the editorial attitude toward the US policy regarding India before 9/11? Did 
the attitude toward US policy change after 9/11? Cross tabulation counts and chi.-square tests 
were used to see if the editorial attitude toward US policy regarding India varied significantly 
before and after September 11, 2001. 
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TABLE 5.18. TONE TOWARD US POLICY REGARDING PAKISTAN 
Tone US policy in Pakistan 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
Chi-S uare Tests 
Pearson Chi-Square 
317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 100.0% 
3 
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.52. 
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A Pearson chi,square result (x2= 1 7 .909, p=0.000) revealed a very significant variance 
in the editorial attitude toward US policy regarding India before and after September 11, 
2001. The percentage of editorials that supported US policy toward India went down from 
30% (30 editorials) before 9/11 to 12.9% (28 editorials) after 9/11. The percentage of 
editorials that were unsupportive of US policy toward India also went down from 4% ( 4 
editorials) before 9/11 to 0.9% (2 editorials) after 9/11. The "not applicable" category did vary 
significantly, increasing from 61 % (61 editorials) before to 73.7% (171 editorials) after 
September 11, 2001. Therefore, it was more likely to find editorial support for US policy 
toward India before 9/11 than after. It was also more likely to find an editorial that did not 
have a detectable attitude toward US policy regarding India after September 11, 2001. Overall, 
of the editorials that had a detectable attitude, it was more likely to find editorials that were 
supportive of the US policy toward India. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support 
hypothesis 6c that posits that the editorials published before and after 9/11 were supportive of 
US policy toward India. 
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TABLE 5.19. EDITORIAL TONE TOWARD US POLICY REGARDING INDIA 
Tone US policy in India 
* Before 9/11 
Cross Tabulation Count 
317 99.7% 1 .3% 318 100.0% 
3 




The purpose of this study was to investigate how the New York Times editorials 
covered India and Pakistan before and after 9/11 and to understand the relationship between 
the media coverage and US foreign policy toward these two countries. 
The study, grounded in framing theory, analyzed the Times' editorial coverage of India 
and Pakistan to see how the newspaper framed the two countries and to determine how the 
editorial tone toward the two countries varied before and after 9/11. Using framing theory, it 
compared the press coverage of the US policy toward India and Pakistan to find evidence to 
support the claim that while reporting international news, the press reports reflect the 
government's policies and resonate with the government's voice. 
The study provided an historical perspective to the US foreign policy in India and 
Pakistan by analyzing and summarizing US policy directives toward and diplomatic relations 
with the two countries. Since 194 7, the US foreign policy toward the two countries has been 
driven mostly by a concern for maintaining peace and stability in South Asia. Colored by 
Cold War considerations for over four decades and the specter of nuclear proliferation during 
the 1990s, the study found that after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the priorities of 
US policy toward the region changed and are now driven by the demands of its war on 
terrorism. 
US relations with India and Pakistan were such that when relations improved with 
one, they soured with the other. Before September 11, 2001, US relations with India were 
better than they had ever been, but with Pakistan, the diplomatic ties were highly strained. 
After September 2001, India and Pakistan pledged support for the US war on terrorism, and 
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US relations with the two countries appear to have improved. This marked a distinct change 
in US, Pakistan relations as Pakistan went from being labeled as a "rogue" nation to being 
labeled as "a major non,Nato ally" and as "the most allied of allies." Was this reversal in policy 
mirrored in the Times' editorial coverage of India and Pakistan? The findings of this study 
show that the editorial coverage of India and Pakistan significantly changed after 9/11, 
reflecting US policy and relations with the two countries after 9/11. 
Most of the editorials discussed India and Pakistan using political frames and, to a 
lesser degree, socio,economic frames. A before and after 9/11 comparison of the frames used 
found that the percentage of editorials that used a political frame went down significantly and 
was accompanied with an increase in the use of the terrorism frame. Over half of the editorials 
did not have a complementary frame. Among those that did, the political frame was the most 
common. The percentage of editorials using terrorism as a complementary frame increased 
significantly, and a significant drop in the use of the Kashmir frame accompanied this increase. 
This may be explained by the fact that after 9/11, more editorials used a "war on terrorism" 
perspective when mentioning India and Pakistan. Given the historical background to the 
struggle over Kashmir, it is highly possible that Pakistan would be portrayed as a supporter of 
terrorism, and therefore the use of the Kashmir frame in editorials would cause dissonance 
with the declaration of Pakistan as a major ally against terrorism. 
The findings also indicate that after September 11, the Times actively used the 
terrorism frame as a complementary frame in its discussion of India and Pakistan. At the same 
time, the use of the Kashmir frame significantly declined. The geographic proximity and 
political significance of India and Pakistan to the US operations in Afghanistan and the 
increased use of the "war on terrorism" perspective may explain the nature of the editorial 
coverage after 9/11. It is highly probable that given the historical background of the struggle 
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over Kashmir, Pakistan would be portrayed as a supporter of terrorism, and this would cause 
the editorials to be incongruent with the declaration of Pakistan as a major ally. 
The very limited use of supplementary frames is reflective of the fact that the editorials 
did not carry frames that opposed the focal argument. The use of an historical perspective, 
which could be found in almost half of the editorials before 9/11, could be detected in only a 
fifth of the editorials after September 11, 2001. This significant drop signaled that the 
editorials were no longer providing the reader with an historical perspective to the region, its 
conflicts or its major players. This implies that the editorial writers presumed that readers 
already had the required historical perspective to understand the region, or that the readers 
were getting this information from somewhere else. 
Most of the editorials mentioned both India and Pakistan. However, the Times 
featured Pakistan significantly more than India in its editorial coverage. The Times 
significantly reduced its tendency to mention both India and Pakistan in its editorials after 
9/11 in favor of editorials focused exclusively on Pakistan. This may be because Pakistan shares 
its western border with Afghanistan, whose former Taliban regime had diplomatic ties with 
Islamabad. 
The study found evidence suggesting that, over five and a half years, the Times' 
editorial coverage of India and Pakistan was mostly negative in tone. This finding was 
congruent with earlier studies of international news in the US media that have found 
coverage to be generally negative in tone and content (Chang, 1993; Lent, 1977). Before 
9/11, the editorials were highly negative; after 9/11 they adopted a more positive tone when 
talking about the two countries. This shift in tone was more pronounced in the editorials 
about Pakistan. The percentage of editorials negative toward Pakistan dropped very 
significantly after 9/11, and was accompanied by a significant rise in the percentage of 
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editorials with a positive tone. Now that Pakistan is a key ally, most editorials lauded this anti.-
terrorist stance by a government ushered in by a military coup. The editorial tone toward 
India did not vary significantly and was slightly positive before and after 9/11. 
An analysis of the editorial portrayals of US relations with India and Pakistan further 
bolstered these findings. Almost all the editorials before 9/11 portrayed US relations with 
Pakistan as cold and strained whereas they mostly portrayed US relations with India as warm 
and close. After 9/11, only a small number of editorials portrayed US relations with Pakistan 
as cold or strained. In ... fact, almost all of the editorials portrayed bilateral relations between the 
two countries as warm and friendly. The fact that Pakistan became a key ally in the US 
military operations in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism makes it likely that these findings 
reflect the new importance of Pakistan to the United States. US policy toward India did not 
change and bilateral relations, driven by long.-term strategic goals, continued to improve on a 
slow and steady positive path. Reflective of American foreign policy, US relations with India 
were consistently portrayed as being warm and friendly throughout the five and half year 
period, and this trend did not change after 9/11. 
The editorials seemed to agree with the US government's assessment and support for 
closer relations with Pakistan after 9/11. Apprehensions about closer relations with Pakistan 
almost disappeared in the editorials published after 9/11. The editorials generally remained 
supportive of closer relations with India throughout the period of study. 
The editorials' tone toward US policies in India and Pakistan remained modestly 
supportive throughout the period of study. The percentage of editorials that were 
unsupportive of US policy toward Pakistan actually went down just a little after 9/11, and so 
did the support for US policy toward India. This decline in the number of editorials critical of 
the US policy toward Pakistan can again be attributed to the crucial geopolitical role of 
95 
Pakistan in the US efforts to flush out insurgents in Afghanistan. However, the surprising 
decrease in the number of editorials supportive of the US policy toward India can only be 
attributed to the general decline in the occurrence of editorials that mentioned India or 
discussed US policy toward India after 9/11. Pakistan was the editorial focus after 9/11 . 
The editorials' support for US policies can also be gleaned from the finding that of all 
the editorials' attributions, US government officials were the most quoted sources. The 
persistent support for US policies toward India and Pakistan in press editorials is in line with 
previous studies that have contended that the press tends to rally around the flag. 
In summary, this content analysis of the New York Times' editorials that mentioned 
India and Pakistan over a five and a half ,year period found that the editorial coverage of 
Pakistan closely cleaved toward US policy toward and relations with Pakistan. The editorial 
coverage became significantly more positive following the trajectory of US foreign policy. And 
as with the US policy toward it, coverage of India did not change significantly. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study' s design precluded gathering of evidence to support a causal relationship 
between US policies toward India and Pakistan and the Times' editorial coverage of the two 
countries. At best, it provides only circumstantial evidence that points toward a relationship 
between US foreign policy and US press coverage. Also, for the analysis to be more reflective 
of US policy and US press coverage, the number of data sources need to be increased. This 
study made use of historical accounts contained in Congressional Research Service 
documents. These are well written, frequently updated, non,partisan, documents that should 
have been supplemented by an analysis of Presidential Papers that mentioned India and/or 
Pakistan as well as the speeches of the President and members of his Cabinet. 
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For a better picture of what the press was saying and how the countries were being 
portrayed, the analysis needs to include not only editorials but also news articles. The New 
York Times is an elite paper that is widely read and respected, but the Washington Post and 
the LA Times can also be useful sources of data. 
Last, coder training is crucial in a study that demands a qualitative analysis of highly 
complex documents. It is recommended that the coders be avid readers, interested in world 
events and national politics, and critical thinkers. This study required the coders to familiarize 
themselves with other countries, international politicians, and conflicts and then to analyze 
media texts critically. It is recommended that the coders undergo extensive training by reading 
and coding several units of analysis prior to actually coding data. It is recommended that 
intercoder reliability be calculated twice - once in the beginning and then at the end of the 




1. Coder Name: _______________________________ _ 
2. Editorial Number: __ _ 
3. Date of publication: __ / __ / ____ (mm/dd/yyyy) 
4. Was the editorial published before September ll'h 2001? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
5. Title of the editorial: 
6. Length of the editorial in number of words: ___ _ 
7. Author of the editorial:---------------------------
8. Geographic arena of the editorial: 
1) International with no significant US component 
2) International with significant US component 
3) National with no significant international link 
4) National with significant international link 
9. Country focus of editorial: 
1) Pakistan and not India 
2) Pakistan mostly, but also mentions India 
3) Mentions Pakistan but not India 
4) Mentions both India and Pakistan 
5) Mentions India, but not Pakistan 
6) India mostly, but also mentions Pakistan 
7) India and not Pakistan 
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10. What is the editorial mainly about, what is the focal frame of the editorial? 
1) Socio-economic frame 5) Nuclear proliferation frame 
2) Political frame 6) Kashmir frame 
3) Religion frame 7) Conflict frame 
4) Terrorism frame 8) Other _____ _ 
11. What is the tone of the focal frame toward the country of focus? 
1) Supportive /positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive / negative 
4) N/A 
12. Is there a complimentary frame? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
13. What is, if any, the complementary frame of the editorial? 
1) Socio-economic frame 5) Nuclear proliferation frame 
2) Political frame 6) Kashmir frame 
3) Religion frame 7) Conflict frame 
4) Terrorism frame 8) Other ______ _ 
14. Is there a supplementary frame? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
15. What is, if any, the supplementary frame of the editorial? 
1) Socio-economic frame 5) Nuclear proliferation frame 
2) Political frame 6) Kashmir frame 
3) Religion frame 7) Conflict frame 
4) Terrorism frame 8) Other ______ _ 
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16. Does the editorial provide historical context to the issue being discussed? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
17. What is, if any, the first source cited? 
1) US government 7) Indian government 
2) US expert 8) Indian expert 
3) US civilian 9) Indian civilian 
4) Pakistani government 10) Others 
5) Pakistani expert 11) None 
6) Pakistani civilian 
18. What is, if any, the second source cited? 
1) US government 7) Indian government 
2) US expert 8) Indian expert 
3) US civilian 9) Indian civilian 
4) Pakistani government 10) Others 
5) Pakistani expert 11) None 
6) Pakistani civilian 
19. What is, if any, the third source cited? 
1) US government 7) Indian government 
2) US expert 8) Indian expert 
3) US civilian 9) Indian civilian 
4) Pakistani government 10) Others 
5) Pakistani expert II) None 
6) Pakistani civilian 
20. What is the editorial's dominant tone toward Pakistan? 
1) Supportive / Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive /Negative 
4) N/A 
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21. What is the editorial's dominant tone toward India? 
1) Supportive / Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive /Negative 
4) N/A 
22. Does the editorial mention the US relations or policy toward Pakistan? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
23. Does the editorial mention the US relations or policy toward India? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
24. How does the editorial portray US relations with Pakistan? 
1) Warm/ Close 
2) Cold/ Strained 
3) N/A 
25. How does the editorial portray US relations with India? 
1) Warm/ Close 
2) Cold/ Strained 
3) N/a 
26. What is the editorial's tone toward US relations with Pakistan? 
1) Supportive/ Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive /Negative 
4) N/A 
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27. What is the editorial's tone toward US relations with India? 
1) Supportive / Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive J Negative 
4) N/A 
28. What is the editorial's tone toward US policy regarding Pakistan? 
1) Supportive/ Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive J Negative 
4) N/A 
29. What is the editorial's tone toward US policy regarding India? 
1) Supportive/ Positive 
2) Neutral 
3) Unsupportive J Negative 
4) N/A 





EDITORIAL NUMBER. Each article in the study has been assigned a numeric identification code. The 
3-digit number has been assigned to the editorials based on the date the editorial was published. The articles 
have been organized chronologically on an ordinal scale where a smaller number indicates that the editorial 
was published at an earlier date. 
DATE OF PUBLICATION. The articles for this study were collected over a 66-month time period (5 
yrs, 6 months). This identification variable asks what date the editorial being analyzed was published in the 
New York Times. The date will be entered in the format of month/date/year or mm/dd/yyyy. 
BEFORE 9/11. Was the editorial published before September 11'h 2001? The articles for this study were 
collected over a 66-month time period (5 yrs, 6 months) and September 11th 2001, serves as a mid point for 
this study and this time period. This study is interested in finding out how the editorial coverage of India and 
Pakistan and the US policy toward these two countries may have changed as a result of changes in the US 
policy due to the 9/11 attacks and so this question tries to identify if the editorial was published before or after 
9/11/01. If it was published before the date, answer 'yes'. 
TITLE OF THE EDITORIAL. The title is important as it may be indicative of the main topics 
covered in the editorial as well as be indicative of the tone/ disposition of the editorial. 
EDITORIAL LENGTH. What is the length of the editorial in numberof words? The length of the 
editorial may be indicative of the relative importance assigned to the issues being covered. The longer length 
of an editorial story about an issue may also be indicative of a more elaborate schema for the issue/ country of 
focus. The length of the editorial is available at the top of retrieved document. 
AUTHOR OF THE EDITORIAL: This variable identifies the writer of the editorial. 
103 
GEOGRAPHIC ARENA OF THE ARTICLE. What is the general geography of the editorial? 
Does it deal with an issue that is mostly international in nature with little or no mentioned US significance? 
Does the editorial have an international focus but also provide a US perspective/component to the issues being 
discussed? Is the story mostly a national one, with little or no significant international component? Or does 
the editorial have a national focus but also features a significant international component? 
COUNTRY FOCUS OF THE ARTICLE. The selected editorials were chosen because they 
mentioned India or Pakistan somewhere in the full-body text. This variable is interested in finding out which 
of the two countries, India and / or Pakistan, are being talked about in the editorial and what is the significance 
of each to the editorial. Is the editorial about Pakistan or is it about India, or are they both mentioned? Or is 
the editorial primarily about one of those countries but also mentions the other. 
10. ' 11. ' 12. ' 13. ' 14. 
FOCAL FRAMES. What are frames? Framing refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some 
aspects of perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality. 
Frames are, in a sense, organized beliefs and strategies that orient individuals to certain perspectives. To frame, 
as an action, is to "participate in public debate strategically" (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). Editorials and other media 
discourses feature multiple frames in most instances. The use of multiple frames provides the readers with 
multiple perspectives and leads to a more complex cognitive schema about the issue or event being discussed. 
This study defines focal frames as the central organizing idea of the editorial. It is the chief frame being used to 
analyze the event or issue. Identifying and classifying frames in media discourses tends to be tricky as the frames 
might not be mutually exclusive and may overlap. It is the responsibility of the coder to select the most 
appropriate frame as the focal frame. An easy way to come to this decision is to have the coders try and 
summarize the editorial in one sentence. 
Frames are categorical, and are not defined as having a valence. This study examines how the authors of the 
editorials are framing India, Pakistan and the US policy toward the two South Asian countries. Thus, the tone 
or direction of editorials toward India and Pakistan becomes important. Following the discussions by Chang 
(1993, p.97) and Budd et al. (1970, p.50-65), the direction of the frame will be coded on a 3-point scale, where 
a positive or favorable disposition will be scored as a 1, neutral with a 2 and a negative or unfavorable 
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disposition will be assigned a score of 3. If the editorial is talking about say the spread of AIDS in India, how 
does the tone of the frame used reflect on India? The tone of the frame will be positive if the India is portrayed 
as combating the spread of AIDS well, negative if the editorial portrays a picture of gloom about the rapid 
spread of the disease and neutral if the editorial is balanced in its portrayal. 
COMPLEMENTARY FRAMES. Complementary frames provide support for the focal frame. Its 
presence is not always a given, but when present, the valence/tone of the complimentary frame will be in the 
same direction of as the tone of the focal frame. If the focal frame is positive, the complimentary frame will be 
positive; if the focal frame is negative, the complimentary frame will be negative too. However, if the focal 
frame is neutral, the complimentary could be positive or negative. 
SUPPLEMENTARY FRAMES. Supplementary frames are much like complementary frames but differ 
in that they are opposite to the focal frame and the complementary frame in tone. If the focal frame and 
complementary frame are positive, the supplementary frame will be negative and if focal frame and 
complementary frame are negative, the supplementary frame will be positive. Supplementary frames add 
complexity to the editorial and may provide for a more complex and developed schema. 
THE FRAME CATEGORIES 
Socio-Economic frame: This frame will deal with issues of social development in society. Issues such as 
education, health care, social justice, law and order, and social mobility are included in this frame. This frame 
will also include references to economic prosperity, economic growth, economic systems, foreign aid, national 
budget, and trade other business news. When the issue at hand reflects back positively or favorably on the 
country of focus, this frame will be assigned a score of 1, if the frame reflects negatively or unfavorable to the 
country of focus, the frame will be assigned a score of 3, and the frame will be assigned a score of 2 in case it is 
neutral. Positive reflectors will include most references to free market economies; conducive conditions for US 
business opportunities, large consumer base, etc. Negative reflectors include most references to the AIDS crisis, 
low social mobility, poverty, illiteracy, weak social or economic institutions, controlled economy, etc. Issues 
such as the growth of the information technology industry in India, the setting up of call centers and other 
'back-office' operations for US companies may be covered in the positive or negative and should be coded 
accordingly. 
Political frame. If the editorial references issues such as the forms of government in India and/or Pakistan, 
national politics including elections or military coup, bilateral diplomatic relations between 
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India/Pakistan/USA, political speeches or initiatives, it will be classified as a political frame. When the issue at 
hand reflects back positively or favorably on the country of focus, this frame will be assigned a score of 1, if the 
frame reflects negatively or unfavorable to the country of focus, the frame will be assigned a score of 3, and the 
frame will be assigned a score of 2 in case it is neutral. In general, democracy and democratic processes can be 
classified as being positive reflectors. Other positive indicators include mention of support for the US war on 
Terror, support for the US war in Afghanistan, US war in Iraq, diplomatic initiative leaders, speeches calling 
for peace etc. If not otherwise mentioned, anti-democratic processes will be classified as being negative along 
with opposition to US military initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq, jingoism and angry rhetoric in political 
speeches, etc. 
Religion frame. This frame includes discussions about events, actors, issues and movements that are associated 
with organized religion. Mention of a country's religious tolerance, religious freedom, religious diversity, or 
religious celebration will be coded as a positive and be awarded a score of 1. Mention of Hindu nationalism, 
Hindu fundamentalism, caste system, Islamic fundamentalism, radicalization of Islam, violence against 
Christians, violence against religious minorities, violence against Muslims, violence between Shia and Sunni 
Muslims, growth of J ihadi organizations, religious intolerance, and discrimination based on religion will be 
coded as a negative and receive a score of 3. If the discussion is very general and cannot be classified as being 
positive or negative in its reflection on the country of focus, it will be labeled as being neutral and assigned a 
score of 2. 
Terrorism frame. The presence of this frame indicates discussion or mention of acts of terrorism, the 
perpetrators and/or the victims. If a country is portrayed as a victim of terrorism, or an ally in the war on 
terrorism, it will be coded as a positive and assigned a score of 1. When a country is indicated as supporting 
terrorism, this frame will be coded as negative with a score of 3. If the country of focus is portrayed as a 
reluctant ally in the war against terrorism, it will be coded as neutral with a score of 2. Additionally, references 
to the militancy in Kashmir as being state-sponsored cross border terrorism will be coded as a positive for India 
and a negative for Pakistan; and reference to the militants as part of an indigenous armed struggle will be coded 
as a negative for India and a positive for Pakistan. 
Nuclear proliferation frame. When the editorial mentions or references issues regarding nuclear tests, nuclear 
weapon and development, technology transfers, missile proliferation, missile tests, military budgets and other 
related issues, it will be categorized under this frame. When the issue being discussed or mentioned reflects 
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back positively or favorably on the country of focus, this frame will be assigned a score of 1, if the frame reflects 
negatively or unfavorable to the country of focus, the frame will be assigned a score of 3, and the frame will be 
assigned a score of 2 in case it is neutral. In general, negative reflectors will include mention of development 
and testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, high military spending, reluctance to sign international 
treaties limiting nuclear and missile proliferation, lack of a nuclear command structure, vulnerable nuclear or 
fissile material etc. 
Kashmir frame. This frame deals with the conflict in and over Kashmir. Discussion of the parties involved in 
the conflict, the human cost of the conflict, and the regional and global implications of the conflict constitute 
this frame. If the country is portrayed as a victim, responsible, making rapprochements for peaceful settlement 
of the conflict, promoting democracy, or as being morally in the right, it will be coded as a positive and be 
awarded a score of 1. If however, a country is discussed as being the aggressor, oppressive, irresponsible, 
irrational, as abusing human rights, supporting the insurgency, or inflaming the conflict in anyway, the frame 
will be coded as being negative and receives a score of 3. Mere mention of Kashmir as a zone of conflict will be 
seen as neutral and afforded a score of 2. If the discussion is very general, mentions Kashmir as a zone of 
conflict and cannot be classified as being positive or negative in its reflection on the country of focus, it will be 
labeled as being neutral and assigned a score of 2. 
Conflict frame. This frame will include discussions about all conflicts involving India and Pakistan but 
excluding the conflict in Kashmir. This frame will be selected if the editorial discusses the conflict between 
India and Pakistan but does not mention Kashmir as an integral part of the conflict. If the country is portrayed 
as a victim, responsible, making rapprochements for peaceful settlement of the conflict, promoting democracy, 
or as being morally in the right, it will be coded as a positive and be awarded a score of 1. If however, a country 
is discussed as being the aggressor, irresponsible, irrational, as abusing human rights, supporting insurgency, or 
inflaming a conflict in anyway, the frame will be coded as being negative and receive a score of 3. If the 
discussion is very general and cannot be classified as being positive or negative in its reflection on the country 
of focus, it will be labeled as being neutral and assigned a score of 2. 




HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. This question asks if the editorial provides any sort of historical 
perspective in its discussion. For example, in the case of the conflict between India and Pakistan, does it 
provide a historical context by mentioning the long standing border disputes between the two countries or the 
wars they have fought against each other. 
16, 17, 18 
SOURCES CITED. The Head of State, members of the administration, military and officials from 
government agencies are all seen as government sources. Civilian sources will include opinions of 'experts', and 
other members of the citizenry. 
19, 20. 
EDITORIAL TONE TOW ARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN. The editorial attitude toward India and 
Pakistan can be described as the perception of either of the two countries impressed by the editorial on the 
reader. The criteria for coding tone or perception will be coded on a 3-point scale, ranging from positive or 
favorable, with a score of 1, to negative or unfavorable with a score of 3. A score of 2 will be assigned as 
neutral. A 'not applicable' option is provided in case the editorial is exclusively one country and the question is 
asking for the editorial tone toward the other. 
21, 22. 
EDITORIAL TONE TOWARD US RELATIONS WITH INDIA & PAKISTAN. The editorial attitude 
toward US relations with India and Pakistan can be defined as the response, whether favorable or unfavorable, 
to the US relations with either of the two countries. When the editorial that described US relations with India 
or Pakistan as desirable, important or vital to US national interests, it will be coded as warm and receive as 
score of 1. If the editorial was apprehensive of US relations with either country the editorial was coded as cold 
and receive a score of 1. If the editorial is not indicative of a clear direction or preference, it will be coded as 
being tepid and receive a score of 2. 
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23, 24. 
EDITORIAL TONE TOW ARD US POLICY REGARDING INDIA & PAKISTAN. Editorial support 
for US policy toward India or Pakistan has been defined as a response, whether favorable or unfavorable, to US 
relations with India or Pakistan. If the editorial praises or approves the US policy regarding India or Pakistan, it 
will be coded as favorable and receive a score of 3. If the editorial is critical of the US policy regarding either of 
the two countries, it will be coded as being unfavorable and afforded the score of 1. Editorials that do not praise 
or criticize the US policy regarding India or Pakistan were coded as neutral and will receive a score of 2. 
<>(§,Thank You ':§>v 
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